Fordham Law Review
Volume 76

Issue 2

Article 2

2007

The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through the Gaps
Between Law and Practice
Evelyn Brody

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through the Gaps Between Law and
Practice, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 521 (2007).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol76/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through the Gaps Between Law
and Practice
Cover Page Footnote
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. This essay cites portions of American Law Institute (ALI),
Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007), which I prepared as
reporter of the project. The ALI membership began, but did not complete, consideration of that Tentative
Draft at its May 2007 annual meeting, and so this essay and that Tentative Draft reflect my views only. I
am grateful to Klaus Hopt, Thomas von Hippel, and other attendees for suggestions on the draft I
presented at the Conference on Comparative Corporate Governance for Nonprofit Organizations,
University of Heidelberg (Heidelberg, Germany, July 6-9, 2006), co-sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung
and the Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and International Private Law (Hamburg). I thank
Professor Hopt for permission to publish this essay in the Fordham Law Review in advance of the
conference volume. I additionally appreciate comments from Francie Ostrower, Dana Brakman Reiser, and
Jack B. Siegel.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol76/iss2/2

THE BOARD OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
PUZZLING THROUGH THE GAPS BETWEEN
LAW AND PRACTICE
Evelyn Brody*
INTRODUCTION

Scholars of American corporate governance-both for-profit and
nonprofit-have long remarked on the contrast between the sketchiness of
the legal regime and the robust and diverse set of practices inside
boardrooms and executive suites.' To many, this state of affairs is the
desired result of a laissez-faire legal structure that sets forth minimum rules
of the road but that otherwise provides only default rules for conduct.
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court-speaking for the state in which most
large U.S. corporations are incorporated-recently observed, "All good
corporate governance practices include compliance with statutory law and
case law establishing fiduciary duties. But the law of corporate fiduciary
duties and remedies for violation of those duties are distinct from the
'2
aspirational goals of ideal corporate governance practices."
This laissez-faire legal construct makes sense for corporations that have
private owners. Minimal laws put a lower bound on behavior to prevent

* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. This essay cites portions of American
Law Institute (ALl), Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations (Tentative Draft No.
1, 2007), which I prepared as reporter of the project. The ALI membership began, but did
not complete, consideration of that Tentative Draft at its May 2007 annual meeting, and so
this essay and that Tentative Draft reflect my views only. I am grateful to Klaus Hopt,
Thomas von Hippel, and other attendees for suggestions on the draft I presented at the
Conference on Comparative Corporate Governance for Nonprofit Organizations, University
of Heidelberg (Heidelberg, Germany, July 6-9, 2006), co-sponsored by the
VolkswagenStiftung and the Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and International
Private Law (Hamburg). I thank Professor Hopt for permission to publish this essay in the
Fordham Law Review in advance of the conference volume. I additionally appreciate
comments from Francie Ostrower, Dana Brakman Reiser, and Jack B. Siegel.
1. Continental European countries are only beginning to debate the desirability of
having a standard legal corporate form for nonprofit organizations, the parameters of such a
form, and whether their governance should be determined by law or voluntary codes of
practice. See Klaus J. Hopt, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Some Thoughts from
the European Continent (Heidelberg, Germany, July 6-9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript,
presented at the Conference on Comparative Corporate Governance for Nonprofit
Organizations, on file with the Fordham Law Review). See generally The European
Foundation: A New Legal Approach (Klaus J. Hopt, W. Rainer Walz, Thomas von Hippel,
& Volker Then eds., 2006) [hereinafter The European Foundation].
2. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).
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opportunistic behavior, but otherwise get out of the way. Where corporate
statutes set forth rules of practice, they can, in most cases, be overridden by
the corporate charter or bylaws. After all, the theory goes, owners do not
need to be protected from themselves and the contracts they might enter
into. To contractarian purists, fiduciary duties in the business context
impose only a duty of loyalty and good faith, and do not expose fiduciaries
of care waived by the
to monetary liability for breaches of the duty
3
shareholders unless there is lack of good faith.
Is such a laissez-faire legal structure appropriate for nonprofit
corporations? This question is particularly important for charities, the
largest category of nonprofit organizations (and thus the category on which
this essay focuses). As a threshold matter, the absence of shareholders is, in
Still, important
practice, more a difference of degree than kind.4
differences exist. Most temptingly, one might wish the law were a tad more
helpful in providing guidance to nonprofit boards, many of which are
stocked with amateurs (in the best sense of the word)-but that is what
"best practices" guides are for. Certainly, we do not want laws to try to
force the variety of types and sizes of nonprofit organizations into a single
mold.
When drafting began on the American Law Institute's (ALI) project on
Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations (for which this author is
reporter), the business sector was enduring a full-blown governance crisis,
culminating in the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. As described in
Tentative Draft No. 1 (2007):
The revelations of passive boards, dissembling executives, and inattentive
(or conflicted) auditors, bankers, and counsel challenged the fundamental
model of corporate governance-the same model, in general, that has
However,
been created for the modem nonprofit organization.
subsequent reforms in law-and, perhaps more important, self-imposed
good business practices-only serve to emphasize that alternatives are not
shortfalls are more to blame than
obvious, suggesting that performance
5
the articulation of legal duties.
Nevertheless, the American legal structure for nonprofit governance
embraces a series of puzzles that add up to a paradoxical message: legal

3. See, e.g., Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.19

cmt. a (1992) (commenting that, in states whose corporate statutes do not explicitly provide
for charter liability shields, shareholders' authority to waive directors' liability can be
analogized to the ability of "a trustee to relieve itself by contract from liability for
negligence, but not for liability from breaches that were in bad faith, intentional, or
recklessly indifferent to the interests of a beneficiary"); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 181101(e) (2005) (permitting limited liability company agreements to waive any liability other

than "for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing").
4. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the

Nonprofit and For-Profit OrganizationalForms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457 (1996). See
generally Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (1996).

5. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs., intro, at 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
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duties apply, but few people can call the governing board or board members
to account, and, even when legal process ensues, nothing much of legal
consequence will follow. In particular, the legal regime contains a series of
gaps between the law "on .the books" and the law as carried out in practice,
and between what the law requires and how boards behave. This essay
explores the following gaps:
A. Corporate law provides that fiduciary duties are owed to "the
corporation."
This is a difficult concept in the business
corporation world; what does it mean in a world without
owners? Should there be a duty to the charitable purpose (or
even to the charitable sector) greater than preserving the charity
on whose board the fiduciary sits?
B. Corporate law states a single, uniform standard of conduct for all
board members, regardless of the type or size of organization.
Should the law recognize differences for small charities, as
business law does for close corporations, or does the absence of
owners make this analogy inapt?
C. Nonprofit corporate law provides that the organization is
"managed by or under the direction of' the board of directors,
without saying much at all about the board's core functions (or
the functions of officers, or the relationship between the board
and management). The management literature, by contrast, is
full of prescriptions.
D. Corporate law empowers the governing board to act only as a
group, yet imposes sanctions for breach of fiduciary duties on
board members only as individuals. Moreover, corporate law
holds each and every governing board member responsible for
governance, yet in practice, different board members bring a
variety of attributes that benefit the organization. How should
the law handle "Mr. Checkbook" and others who want to be on
the board but do not want to participate in governance?
E.

Nonprofit statutory law simply substitutes the word "members"
for "shareholders" in provisions that call for an additional check
on the board (usually in extraordinary transactions).
The
definition of member for legal purposes, however, is limited to
those with the right to elect members of the board. Thus, no
additional oversight applies to the majority of U.S. charities that
lack members, and whose boards are self-perpetuating. Even
where there are members of the charity, are they the right
constituency to have shareholder-like authority?

F.

For corporations that are charities, the law endows only the state
attorney general, co-fiduciaries, and (rarely granted) persons
with a special interest with "standing" to bring a legal complaint
for fiduciary wrongdoing. (The charity itself can also bring
suit.) With the burden of proof falling on the plaintiff to show
who caused harm to the organization and to quantify that harm,
the risk of personal monetary liability is slight. Additional
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protections from monetary liability separately shield a governing
board member who acted in good faith and did not engage in
self-dealing. Should nonprofit-corporation fiduciaries be more,
less, or equally protected from personal monetary risk compared
with business-corporation fiduciaries?
An examination of these gaps reveals how weak a force the law is in the
area of charity governance-but also reveals why "tightening" the law is
not the answer. 6 The Conclusion offers the hope that regulators will make
greater use of appropriate non-monetary equitable remedies to address poor
governance. To a large degree, though, good governance will always
depend on adoption of recommended practices and adherence to what a
'7
leading charity trade group calls "obedience to the unenforceable."
Finally, a caveat: This essay primarily addresses corporate governance;
different considerations might arise in the case of a charitable trust,
particularly one governed by a single trustee or cotrustees not functioning
as a board. 8 Some of the differences between corporate and trust law are
touched on below. In light of the spectacular $30 billion gift announced in
2006 by Warren Buffett to the Gates Foundation-a charitable trust whose
current trustees are Bill and Melinda Gates (Buffett will join them)additional governance issues for charity trustees lie tantalizingly beyond the
scope of this discussion.
I. DISCUSSION

A. To Whom (or What) Are Board Duties Owed?
1. What the Law Requires
The duty of loyalty of an individual board member requires acting in a
way that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
organization. This duty is usually applied structurally, by looking to
fiduciaries who lack incentives or relationships that would compromise
their ability to make objective decisions in the best interests of the

6. Whether tax benefits are appropriate for certain types of governance structures or
behavior is beyond the scope of this essay. See John D. Colombo, IRS and State Revenue
Department Oversight of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States (Heidelberg,
Germany, July 6-9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Conference on
Comparative Corporate Governance for Nonprofit Organizations, on file with the Fordham
Law Review); see also Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What Is the
I.R.S. Role in Charity Governance?, 21 U. Haw. L. Rev. 537 (1999); John Simon, Harvey
Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in The
Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook 267 (Walter Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d
ed. 2006).
7. Indep. Sector, Obedience to the Unenforceable: Ethics and the Nation's Voluntary
and Philanthropic Community (2d ed. 2002).
8. Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 641 (2005); see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320 cmt. b(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
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organization. 9 As I have explained elsewhere,' 0 this structural goal
comprises two overlapping, but analytically distinct, concepts:

independence and (usually financial) disinterest.' I
Independence does not, of course, require board member independence
from key constituents, to whom the board remains accountable in practice,
if not by law. Notably, for charities, the founders may specify structural
terms in the organizational documents, donors may restrict the charity's
discretion in the use of gifts, and major donors might be named to the
governing board. If the organization has voting members, they not only
elect the governing board, but also participate in decisions to take certain
extraordinary actions. 12 Even within these legitimate constraints, though,
every board member's duties run to the organization regardless of how that
board member obtained his or her seat. The fiduciaries must be free to
exercise their judgment in the best interests of the organization.' 3
In legal terms, trustees of a private trust owe their fiduciary duties to the
beneficiaries, while board members of a business corporation owe their
duties to the corporation (generally taken to mean putting the interests of
the shareholders above those of other stakeholders). 14 The duties of
fiduciaries of nonprofit mutual-benefit organizations (i.e., non-charitable
nonprofits) might seem to run to the members, but all nonprofits have an
element of public interest in their purposes (this appears most clearly in the
federal requirements for tax exemption). As for a charitable trust, which
lacks ascertainable beneficiaries who can enforce their rights, fiduciary
duties are said to run to the charitable purpose.1 5 For charities in general,
adopting either the trust approach (duties are owed to the charitable

9. Of course, current law permits a wide variety of forms of governance for formal
charitable activity. In the simplest form, a single person might be the trustee of a charitable
trust, and perform all the management functions himself or herself.
A voluntary
organization might take the form of a corporation in which members of the governing body
serve as the officers, whether or not the organization also engages professional staff. Family
foundations typically limit their boards to family members. See infra Part I.B-C.
10. See Brody, supra note 8.
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See infra Part I.E.
13. Cf Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, and
Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit
Sector 78 (2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel-Final-Report.pdf
(recommending that a charity whose board is not sufficiently independent should be
classified as a private foundation under the federal tax rules).
14. The official comment to the 1998 changes to section 8.30(a) of the Model Business
Corporation Act explains,
The phrase "best interests of the corporation" is key to an explication of a
director's duties. The term "corporation" is a surrogate for the business enterprise
as well as a frame of reference encompassing the shareholder body.
In
determining the corporation's "best interests," the director has wide discretion in
deciding how to weigh near-term opportunities versus long-term benefits as well
as in making judgments where the interests of various groups within the
shareholder body or having other cognizable interests in the enterprise may differ.
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(a) cmt. 1 (2005).
15. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 (2007).
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purpose) or the corporate approach (duties are owed to the entity itself), the
legal result should be the same. Most important, the law does not allow
general societal interests, or even charitable goals unrelated to a given
charity's purposes, to override the charity's privately determined purposes.
Moreover, the law does not require that the fiduciaries keep this particular
entity in existence when merger or liquidation might better serve its
charitable purposes. Indeed, the law generally endows the governing board
with the power and right, under appropriate circumstances, to amend or
modify the organization's charitable purposes (or to go to court to do so,
depending on the legal form and the terms of the organizational
documents). 16
Stating the duty of loyalty the other way around, nonprofit law prohibits
fiduciaries from governing for private purposes-that is, for the benefit of
board members, executives, donors, or other private parties. Of course,
private individuals-including employees and beneficiaries-will
necessarily benefit from the entity's activities, but incidental benefit is not
the legal focus.
2. What Occurs in Practice
The "to whom are duties owed?" question remains a persistent one in the
nonprofit sector.
A nonprofit organization frequently has multiple
"stakeholders," all of whom seek to speak for the organization and its
purposes. 17 Board members sometimes feel beholden to the person or
group that recommended, nominated, or elected them to the board. Indeed,
it is not uncommon-as in perhaps more business corporations than we
want to admit-that the board as a whole defers excessively to the chief
executive officer (CEO) for this very reason. 18 Of course, the variety of
perspectives brought to the boardroom by the board members enhances
governance, and the board members might reasonably differ on what
decisions they believe to be in the organization's best interests.
More broadly, the purposes of a given charity do not necessarily (or even
usually) coincide with "the public interest." 19 Occasionally the attorney

16. See generally Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 310 cmt. a(l) (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007). The members, if any, of a corporate charity usually must approve
amendments to the articles of incorporation. See infra Part I.E. In the case of a charitable
trust, the court (if not otherwise specified in the trust instrument) determines how existing
assets may be used. Whether a corporate charity that amends its purpose can use previously
acquired assets (other than explicitly restricted gifts) for the new purpose is under debate.
See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. §§ 240, 250 (Council Draft No. 5, 2007).
17. See generally Evelyn Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, in The State of

Nonprofit America 471 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. In concurring in the Bob Jones University v. United States decision, Justice Lewis

Powell observed that over 106,000 organizations filed information returns as § 501(c)(3)
organizations in 1981. He found "it impossible to believe that all or even most of those
organizations could prove that they demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony with the public
interest or that they are beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life." Bob Jones
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general has purported to protect the public interest when he or she perceives
that interest to clash with the organization's interests as determined by its
board. 20 Judges, too, might be overly deferential to the dead hand, invoking
the trust law doctrine of cy pres to disallow the redeployment of charitable
assets held by a nonprofit corporation for other than the corporation's
original purpose.
B. OrganizationalType, OrganizationalSize
1. What the Law Requires
Nonprofit corporate law imposes the same standards of conduct on
fiduciaries of all types of nonprofits-charity or mutual benefit-and on
nonprofits of all sizes. More precisely, some laws make accommodations
based on type or size with respect to filing requirements or attorney general
oversight authority, but the law, at least facially, imposes uniform duties on
all fiduciaries. 21
Both trust and corporate law impose minimum,
nonwaivable obligations of loyalty and the good faith exercise of care.
Some have called for requiring the fiduciaries of charities, perhaps even
more than mutual benefit nonprofits, to be subject to the highest fiduciary
standards. 22 However, legislators, regulators, and judges try to balance the
attractiveness of board service against requirements that might better
protect charitable assets. Many charities operate enterprises subject to the
management demands of a complex business, and the standards of fiduciary
liability for charities regardless of their organizational form have been
trending toward the business-corporation standard. Courts defer to the
business judgment of charity managers; state legislatures have relaxed the
investment duties of institutional fund managers; and Congress permits
independent board members of public charities to set management's
compensation and other benefits.

Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialismand Paternalism in State Charity
Law Enforcement, 79 Ind. L.J. 937 (2004) (discussing, among other cases, the Hershey Trust
Company's thwarted attempt to diversify its holdings in Hershey Foods Company stock).

21. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 83840 (1980); see also James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit CorporationLaw and
an Agenda for Reform, 34 Emory L.J. 617, 618 (1985).
State law does make special

provision for ensuring that the value of charitable assets remains in charitable solution;
similarly, the Internal Revenue Code contains specific prohibitions on self-dealing by
insiders of private foundations and excise taxes on insiders who engage in "excess benefit
transactions" with public charities and social welfare organizations. Separately, as described
in Part LE, the law sets forth minimal member rights for membership organizations.
22. See Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1400,
1428-29 (1998) (discussing this debate).
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2. What Occurs in Practice
Some nonprofit fiduciaries seem to believe that passion and good
intentions produce a halo that protects those who neglect their legal
responsibilities. No one denies that it would be cheaper, for example, to
have a single employee handle all aspects of financial matters-checks and
balances and other internal controls are deliberately inefficient. The
constant stream of news stories of charity embezzlement and other
wrongdoing, 23 however, constitute an unacceptable blemish on the
24
nonprofit sector.
A sympathetic view of fiduciary behavior in small nonprofits was
presented by James Fishman in 1985: "Many nonprofit corporations,
particularly
smaller
organizations,
ignore
directors'
statutory
responsibilities and corporate formalities.... Should differing corporations,
united only by the proscription against private inurement and their desire to
obtain an exemption from income tax, be treated by state corporation
statutes in the same way?" 2 5 He argues for "a nonprofit equivalent to the
close corporation" in state nonprofit corporation law. 26 Under Fishman's
proposal, the legal consequences would be as follows:
The private inurement proscription and restrictions on the distribution
of assets upon dissolution would remain. For tax and corporate law
purposes, the close nonprofit corporation would be treated as an
incorporated partnership.
The receipt of funds from patrons or
governmental donors would be treated as partnership income, yet such
income would not be taxed so long as the income and monies dispersed
for salaries and expenses were reasonable. Enforcement would rest upon
27
state and federal tax authorities.

Finally, Fishman proposes, "Liability for the misuse of public monies and
the advantages of tax-exempt status would shift directly to the individuals

23. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and
Directorsof Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, 42 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 25

(2003).
24. For recommended practices, see generally Richard P. Chait, William P. Ryan &

Barbara E. Taylor, Governance as Leadership: Refraining the Work of Nonprofit Boards
(2005); Jack B. Siegel, A Desktop Guide for Nonprofit Directors, Officers, and Advisors:
Avoiding Trouble While Doing Good (2006); James J. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for
Directorsof Nonprofit Corporations,7 Pace L. Rev. 389 (1987).
25. Fishman, supra note 21, at 665-66.
26. Fishman explains,
The close nonprofit corporation would have the definitional characteristics of

an integration of directors and employees and an upper level of permitted assets.
A certain percentage of budget allocations for salaries of staff and directors might
be another indicator of close corporation status.

Most importantly, the close

nonprofit corporation would be eligible for classification under section 501(c)(3)
and section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Id. at 666.
27. Id. at 667-68.
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in the organization and away from an artificially separated board of
28
directors."
The draft ALI Nonprofit Principles do not make substantive distinctions
among nonprofits based on their size, although how fiduciary duties are
carried out might vary with the nonprofit's organizational form, as well as
with its size, structure, and type. Charities in particular should all be
required to have sufficient governance capacity to protect the public
interest.
C. Inside the Black Box: Board/ManagementRelations
1. What the Law Requires
a. The Independent-BoardMonitoringModel
Historian Peter Dobkin Hall traces the modem corporate governance
structure to the charter of the colonial Massachusetts Bay Company, "which
created the first American board" and separated executive authority from
legislative authority. 29 U.S. corporate law has generally converged on the
"independent-board monitoring model" of organizational governance: the
exercise of informed oversight by a group of individuals, a majority of
whom are separate from management. 30 However, this separation is not
31
always easy to achieve.
The ALI's 1992 Principles of Corporate Governance pointed out that
legislatures commonly fail to address the distinct governance role of the
board of a public company by improperly assigning it management
responsibility. The ALI commented, "Although the statutes literally seem
to require the board to either manage or direct the management of the
corporation, it is widely understood that the board of a publicly held
corporation normally cannot and does not perform those functions in the
usual sense of those terms." '32 The ALI articulated and embraced the

28. Id. at 668.
29. Peter Dobkin Hall, A History of Nonprofit Boards in the United States 3 (2003).
30. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of Historyfor CorporateLaw,
89 Geo. L.J. 439, 455-56 (2001). Compare the two-tier German model described in Klaus J.
Hopt, The German Two-Tier Board: Experience, Theories, Reforms, in Comparative
Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research 227 (Klaus J. Hopt,
Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch & Stefan Prigge eds., 1998). Professor Hopt

describes how the unitary model (as found in the United States and the United Kingdom) has
come to resemble the two-tier European model of a management board controlled by a
supervisory board, in light of the recent moves in the United States to separate the functions
of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the board chair and to a require that a majority of
the board be independent. See Hopt, supra note 1.
31. See supra Part I.A.
32. Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 3.02 cmt. a
(1992).
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board
independent-board monitoring model, under which an unconflicted
33
oversees a separate staff that carries out day-to-day operations.
A different approach can be found in the proposal for a new legal
structure for European Foundations. 34 Article 4.2 of that proposal would
permit a European Foundation to have a supervisory board (consisting of at
least three members), but would make a supervisory board mandatory for a
foundation whose assets exceed a threshold amount (unspecified). 35 The
role of the supervisory board would be broader than that of an audit
committee (discussed below), because the supervisory board "should
monitor the decisions of the Board of Directors for compliance at all times
with the foundation's formation deed and statutes [bylaws] ...

as well as

with the relevant law of the country where the foundation is registered and
of the countries in which it is active." 36 Finally, the proposal provides, "If
the Supervisory Board discovers serious irregularities which, after
reasonable written notice, the Board of Directors fails to correct or prevent,
it shall report these facts to the auditors and/or to the State supervisory
Commentary addresses the
authority as may be appropriate." 3 7
composition and operations of the supervisory board, but it does not say
is, who makes sure that the supervisory
who guards the guardians-that
38
board performs its duties.
In attempting to separate oversight and management, a few state
nonprofit corporation statutes require that a majority of directors be
uncompensated (other than as board members), or that a minimum number
of board members be unrelated to each other, or that certain core
committees comprise only independent directors. 39 More cautiously, the
33. For scholarly analysis of business-corporation boards, see the sources cited in the
Principles of Corporate Governance. Id. Scholarship continues to explicate the independentboard monitoring model. See, e.g., William G. Bowen, Inside the Boardroom: Governance
by Directors and Trustees (1994); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group
Decisionmaking in CorporateGovernance, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
34. In continental Europe, as discussed further in Part LE, the law distinguishes
foundations, which have no members and thus are perceived as needing additional
supervision, from associations, which are monitored by their members. See generally The
European Foundation, supra note 1; see also infra note 136.
35. See The European Foundation, supra note 1, at 115.
36. Id. at 118.
37. Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
38. Cf Part I.D (describing the "sterilization option" of which some U.S. charities avail
themselves). But see The European Foundation, supra note 1, at 121 (relating to the powers
of a founder, which are discussed further in Part I.F.2). Moreover, article 4.1.1, paragraph 4,
provides, "The members of the Board of Directors and of the Supervisory Board are
personally liable to the European Foundation for losses deemed attributable to any
negligence, reckless acts or willful defaults on their part." The European Foundation, supra
note 1, at 86.
39. In the business sector, some corporation statutes or stock exchange listing
requirements require the board to be composed of a majority of disinterested directors, or
require certain committees (such as the audit committee or special litigation committee) to
be composed of exclusively disinterested directors. Some states are considering importing
these and other corporate governance reforms into their nonprofit corporation statutes. See
Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 310 cmt. c(3), § 325 cmt. b(5) (Tentative Draft
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Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (approved by the American Bar
Association in 1987) includes an optional provision for legislatures to adopt
that requires a majority of the board to consist of financially disinterested
members, commenting, "The section is optional as many members of the
Subcommittee... felt that its provisions would be ineffective in preventing
intentional abuses, while presenting a burdensome or inconvenient
Legitimate public benefit corporations might have
requirement....
difficulty in finding active and competent directors who had no financial
interest in the corporation." 40 The 2006 Exposure Draft of the Proposed
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition does not contain4 1 a
provision requiring independent directors, even as an optional provision.
Distinct from positional independence, a fiduciary might have a conflict
of interest with respect to a particular transaction. Transactional conflicts
of interest cannot always (and sometimes should not) be eliminated, but
rather must be managed in a way that serves the organization's interests.
Accordingly, the governing board may, if consistent with its fiduciary
duties, waive a potential conflict of interest. This usually requires that the
board adopt and follow procedures to protect the charity. As a starting
point, advisors today strongly recommend that every organization adopt and
enforce an appropriate conflict of interest policy. Generally, as to a
particular transaction or conduct, the conflicted fiduciary must make
appropriate disclosures and refrain from participating in the decision
reached by the unconflicted board members, who must determine and
document that the transaction is fair to and in the best interests of the
organization. The ALI's draft Nonprofit Principles encourage charities to
require disclosure of nonfinancial dualities of interest as well as of financial
42
conflicts of interest.
b. What the Board Does
The law provides few affirmative statements of the functions of the
board, in contrast to broad declarations of the duties that the fiduciaries owe
to the organization. The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance observe

No. 1, 2007); Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of
Recent Legislative Proposalsfor Nonprofit Reform, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 559, 562 (2005).

For a prescient treatment of this issue, see Karyn R. Vanderwarren, Note, Financial
Accountability in Charitable Organizations: Mandating an Audit Committee Function, 77
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 963 (2002).
Separately, many
40. Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.13 cmt. (1987).
nonprofits have not only volunteer directors, but also uncompensated officers (instead of, or
in addition to, professional staff). As mentioned in Parts L.A and .B, practices and staffing
will, of course, vary by the size and resources of the organization. See generally Michael W.
Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo, "Independence" and the "EO'"Governing Board: A
General Counsel's Guide, 41 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 379 (2003).
41. See Proposed Model Nonprofit Corp. Act, Third Ed. (Exposure Draft 2006),
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL580000/sitesofinterestfiles/MNCAexpos

uredraft.doc.
42. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 310 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 1,2007).
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that, "[i]n general, state corporation statutes have not defined the functions
of directors and officers with specificity," and "have not provided realistic
guidance as to such matters as the board's core functions ...or the
functions of important committees." 4 3 The law generally assumes that the
governing board confines itself to setting policy and overseeing those who
actually engage in the management. The ALI observed, "[T]he board can
normally satisfy the requirements of present statutes without either actively
managing or directing the management of the corporation, as long as it
oversees management and retains the decisive voice on major corporate
actions."44

While the board is thus encouraged to delegate the conduct of functions,
it may not abdicate its oversight duties over how those functions are carried
out. Courts typically draw the line at the "abdication" of responsibilities, as
well as the delegation of core activities. 45 As described in Part I.D below,
these fiduciary duties apply at the individual level. Thus, the 1998
amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act describe the required
oversight in the following terms:
While the facts will be outcome-determinative, deficient conduct
involving a sustained failure to exercise oversight-where found
actionable-has typically been characterized by the courts in terms of
abdication and continued neglect of a director's duty of attention, not a
brief distraction or temporary interruption. However, embedded in the
oversight function is the need to inquire when suspicions are aroused.
This duty... does not entail proactive vigilance, but arises when, and
only when, particular facts and circumstances of material concern (e.g.,
evidence of embezzlement at a high level
or the discovery of significant
46
inventory shortages) suddenly surface.

Similarly, in the nonprofit sector, Judge Gerhard Gesell declared in the
influential Sibley Hospital case:
Total abdication of the supervisory role .. .is improper even under
traditional corporate principles. A director who fails to acquire the
information necessary to supervise investment policy or consistently fails
even to attend the meetings at which such policies are considered has
violated his fiduciary duty to the corporation. While a director is, of
course, permitted to rely upon the expertise of those to whom he has
delegated investment responsibility, such reliance is a tool for interpreting
the delegate's reports, not an excuse for dispensing with or ignoring such
reports.
A director whose failure to supervise permits negligent
mismanagement by others to go unchecked has committed an independent

43. Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.01, 4.01(a)
cmt. b (1992).
44. Id. § 3.02 cmt. a.
45. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 325 cmt. a(1) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
46. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.3 1(a)(2)(iv) cmt. l(f) (2005).
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wrong against the corporation; he is not merely an accessory47under an
attenuated theory of respondeat superioror constructive notice.
As to the important question of the relationship between the board and
day-to-day management, the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance
comment,
The board's obligation to oversee the performance of the principal
senior executives does not imply an antagonistic relationship between the
board and the executives. Rather, it contemplates a collegial relationship
that is supportive as well as watchful .... [T]he relationship between the
board and the executives
should be challenging yet positive, arm's length
48
but not adversary.
Following recent scandals in the business world, legislatures, regulators,
courts, and advisors have been calling for a reexamination of the
relationship between board and senior executives, as a matter of best
practice, if not of law.
2. What Occurs in Practice
a. Board/StaffRelationship
The independent-board monitoring model has attracted thoughtful
criticism. For example, James Cox observes, "[T]he outside director wins
the position of monitor by default. The task assigned to the outside director
is justified not by what outside directors actually do, but rather by an
abstract belief in what outside directors can do relative to other potential
monitoring mechanisms." 49 Lawrence Mitchell concludes,
It may be that the monitoring board, in its ideal form or as an aspirational
model, could be a reasonable tool of corporate oversight. But as a legal
model it fails and has become an institution of corporate governance that
is essentially a fraud, designed not to govern but to protect corporate
directors from liability.5° The recent Disney decision is the judicial
perfection of that fraud.

47. Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381
F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.D.C. 1974).
48. Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 3.02 cmt. d
(1992).
49. James D. Cox, The ALI, Institutionalization, and Disclosure: The Quest for the
Outside Director'sSpine, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1233, 1237 (1993).
50. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards 2 (Geo. Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub.
Law
& Legal Theory,
Working Paper No.
159, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-801308 (written before the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
chancery court); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a
Theoretical View of CorporateMisconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 Va. L. Rev.
1099 (1977); Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Boards of Directors, 40 San Diego L.
Rev. 781 (2003); Jill E.Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 265 (1997);
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797 (2001).
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Board members, in both business and nonprofit corporations, are parttimers, often volunteers, serving for a variety of altruistic, social, and even
selfish reasons, and (for the outside directors) not likely to be technically
skilled in the business of the enterprise. By contrast, many CEOs, in both
types of corporations, are often more energetic, dominating, "true
believers," and technically proficient. (Of course, many nonprofitsparticularly small ones-have no paid staff either.) These features of the
relationship do not, however, detract from the important function of having
management prepare themselves to explain and justify their actions on a
regular basis to a separate body. For such a process to be effective,
however, the board must be sufficiently well constituted and vigilant to spur
management to take this activity seriously.
In the case of nonprofits, some observers believe that the absence of
shareholders emphasizes an inappropriate reversal of the power relationship
between the board and the officers. In 2004, the Missouri attorney general
analyzed the oversight performed by the board of the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation. 5 1 The report recommended,
The Board needs to re-assess and formalize its oversight and control of
the organization at every level, both with respect to internal operations
and the Foundation's programmatic decision-making. To achieve this,
the Board should establish clear policies and procedures for ordinary
operations of the Foundation, and make clear and express delegations of
authority to management within those policies and procedures. Just as
important, the Board should clearly identify those operations and
decisions of extraordinary import that merit direct Board control and
oversight. This is the only means by which the Board can effectively
ensure that management is being successful in implementing
the Board's
52
vision for the Foundation, and not the other way around.
The management literature on the board-staff relationship abounds in a
variety of prescriptive models-cooperative (partnership), hierarchical
(board dominates), or deferential (CEO dominates).
Those models,
however, fail to capture the complexity of the real world. Francie Ostrower
and Melissa Stone's recent survey of the academic literature identifies the
myriad influences and factors that determine how a board functions,
including the personal characteristics of board members and of the CEO
(such as gender, prestige or wealth of board members, length of CEO
tenure, and degree of CEO professionalism), organizational factors (such as
the life cycle of the organization, its size, and its degree of
bureaucratization), and environmental factors (such as interorganizational
relationships and other boundary-spanning ties, resource dependency, and
53
organizational financial health or crisis).
51. Mo. Att'y Gen., Review and Recommendations Regarding the Ewing Marion Kauffiman
Foundation (2004), http://ago.mo.gov/newsreleases/2004/kauffianreport030404.htm.

52. Id.
53. Francie Ostrower & Melissa M. Stone, Governance: Research Trends, Gaps, and
Future Prospects, in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, supra note 6, at 612.
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In assessing how boards monitor authority delegated to management,
attention is turning to the importance of "deciding what the board should
decide."'54 Michael Useem and Andy Zelleke recently explored the striking
contrast between the isomorphism of the "outward features" '55 of the
governance structure of U.S. public companies-"clear observables ' '56 such
as the separation of the chair and CEO, board size, and compensationwith the necessary variety of internal practices that occur below the radar
screen. After all, they observe, a corporation's "decision protocol is treated
as a confidential document, and directors and executives have generally
never had opportunity to examine decision protocols of companies other
than their own," and so "no shared norm for what constitutes best form has
yet emerged."'57 Nevertheless, they find that, "[w]hatever the membership
and configuration of the board, and despite the institution of annual
calendars and decision protocols, decisions on what deserves board
attention when new issues arise are still largely the preserve of
management. '58 They conclude, however, that recent legal reforms that
require independent directors to meet periodically without the chief
executive, that "restor[e] director dominion over major company
decisions," and that populate key committees with only independent
directors "are pressing directors to become more alert and engaged in
decisions for which they may be held more accountable." 59 Accordingly,
"[a] culture of governance is emerging at the corporate apex in which
executives are expected by directors to be more mindful of what the board
60
has decided it wants to decide."
Yet despite the recent Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and stock-exchange
independence requirements, even the boards of large publicly traded
companies appear to follow a governance model that cedes a great deal of
authority to management. PricewaterhouseCoopers recently found,
When the 2005 What Directors Think study surveyed directors about
who is primarily responsible for setting their board meeting agendas, 74%

For a set of studies in the United Kingdom, see The Governance of Public and Non-Profit
Organisations: What Do Boards Do? (Chris Comforth ed., 2003); see also Sally Maitlis,
Taking It from the Top: How CEOs Influence (and Fail to Influence) Their Boards, 25 Org.

Stud. 1275 (2004) (studying CEO influence on boards of British symphony orchestras). For
a comprehensive literature survey of nonprofit governance across various academic fields,
see Alan Hough, Myles McGregor-Lowndes & Christine Ryan, Theorizing About Board
Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Surveying the Landscape (Washington, D.C., Nov.
19, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 34th Annual Conference of the
Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
54. Michael

Useem & Andy Zelleke,

Oversight and Delegation in Corporate

Governance: Deciding What the BoardShould Decide, 14 Corp. Governance 2, 2 (2006).
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 10.
58. Id. at 9.
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id.
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said agenda direction comes from the CEO.
Only 14% said a
nonexecutive chair sets the agenda and 10% said leadership emanates
primarily from either a lead director or the general counsel/corporate
secretary.... This finding might raise eyebrows among strict proponents
of board independence, but it appears to be ingrained in many companies'
culture. When asked where board leadership should emanate from, 47%
believe
believe it should come from the CEO .... Only 38% of directors
61
board leadership should emanate from a nonexecutive chair.
Some studies, furthermore, emphasize the power relationships within the
board, with board members often deferring to, among others, the board
chair, longer-tenured or dominating members, and those with expertise
(particularly financial expertise). One study of three museum boards found
that those who participate in governance thought someone else made the
decisions-except for the executive directors, who are "aware of their
''
power and willing to acknowledge that they had used it. 62
In small organizations, the line between oversight and management blurs,
63
reflecting an "associational" organization more than a "bureaucratic" one.
Consider one recent account of the spiral that leads to an ever-diminishing
group taking an increasing share of the work:
An inner group emerged as people who were seen to have the skills,
knowledge, enthusiasm or time volunteered or were persuaded to
undertake tasks for the agency.... As their experience and confidence
grew, they took on more and more of the work. In the long run they
could find it increasingly difficult to reduce the load. Those outside the
inner circle were reluctant to take over partly because the time
commitment had become significant and partly because they felt that they
lacked the knowledge and experience of those in the inner group. When
some of the active minority eventually left the agency, those who were
left tended to find it easier to take on additional responsibilities rather
than to persuade other people to join the inner group .... In extreme cases

the active members struggled on until, exhausted or "burned
out," they
64
were forced to drop out and create an organisational crisis.
For larger governing boards, most of the work occurs in committees,
raising a separate set of issues relating to the internal governance of the
board. 65 While not all nonprofits-even of the same size or in the same
industry-have the same structure, common standing committees include
61. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP & Corp. Board Member, What Directors Think 4
(2005),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/870C33ACFC7C57C385256FA300
7252CF/$file/cbm-wdt-2005.pdf.
62. Mike Bieber, Governing Independent Museums: How Trustees and Directors
Exercise Their Powers, in The Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organisations: What
Do Boards Do?,supra note 53, at 164, 179.
63. See also supra Part I.C.
64. Colin Rochester, The Role of Boards in Small Voluntary Organisations, in The
Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organisations: What Do Boards Do?, supra note 53,
at 115, 118.
65. See also infra Part I.D.
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the executive committee, the audit committee, the nominating committee,
the governance/program committee, the finance and investment committee,
the development/fund-raising committee, the compensation committee, and
(for membership organizations) the membership committee. Ad hoc
committees might include a chief executive search committee, a special
litigation committee, and a committee to consider a merger or sale of
substantially all the assets of the organization.
A recent Urban Institute survey of nonprofit governance practices found,
among other things, that "[i]t was only among nonprofits with over $40
million that a majority of organizations had an audit committee"; indeed,
only fifty-eight percent of this class had an audit committee. 66 Such a
finding does not mean, however, that the board is not performing audit
committee functions. More troubling is the study's finding that nineteen
percent of large nonprofits had management serving on the audit
committee. 67 Worse, "[40] percent of those that include paid staff on the
audit committee said it would be somewhat or very difficult to comply with
a law prohibiting all staff from serving on the audit committee, and 21
percent said it would be very difficult. '68 But it should not take a law to
require this practice: How can an audit committee do its proper job of
supervising management if management sits on the committee?
b. Board Functions and How Board Members Learn Their Craft
The ALI Nonprofit Principles project has a significant educational
component. In an attempt to describe the functions of the typical charity
governing board, section 320(b) of Tentative Draft No. 1 states that, subject
to law and the organizational documents, the governing board's functions
include (but are not limited to):
(1) monitoring implementation of the charity's purposes, and
modifying those purposes as necessary and appropriate in
accordance with §§ 230 and 240;
(2) adopting bylaw provisions that address governance issues, and
amending the bylaws as necessary and appropriate;
(3) constituting the governing board and filling the chief executive
position, and monitoring the board's and the chief executive's
performance of their legal and organizational responsibilities;
(4) holding periodic meetings of the board (and membership, if
any);
(5) setting and reviewing policies, particularly those addressing
matters reserved to the board by law or the organizational
66. Francie Ostrower & Maria J. Bobowick, Nonprofit Governance and the SarbanesOxley
Act
2
(2006),
available
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311363_nonprofit-govemance.pdf.
67, Id. app. at 7.

68. Id. at 2-3.

at
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documents, and providing direction to and oversight
management;

of

(6) [overseeing] the charity's fiscal integrity and performance by
adopting the budget, setting investment and spending policies,
seeking appropriate resources, and exercising oversight over the
charity's assets, both investment and programmatic;
(7) overseeing appropriate communication
constituencies and the public; and

with the charity's

(8) [overseeing the establishment of] appropriate procedures for
internal controls, including financial
controls, legal compliance,
69
and information flow to the board.
Nonprofit trusteeship is a highly institutionalized activity, although the
form the institution takes varies with the society that produced it. 70 The
number of U.S. nonprofit organizations has exploded-in 1940 there were
about 12,000 exempt organizations, 7 1 but by 2005 there were over 1.7
million on the Internal Revenue Service Business Master File (which does
not include most churches). 72 All of these organizations must staff their
boards, amounting nationwide to millions of positions on the boards of

69. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
The bracketed material reflects corrections that will be made in the next draft.
70. See Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector 138 (1992).
71. Id. at 136-37.
72. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs., intro., reporter's note 3 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007). Most important, note the growth in the charity subsector. The number
of organizations exempt under Internal Revenue Code § 501 (c)(3) that appear in the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) Business Master File grew 350% from 1975 to 2001, and, as of 2004,
stood at 1,010,365. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, Historical Development and Present Law
of the Federal Tax Exemption for Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations (2005)
(citing to IRS Statistics of Income Division reports and the Business Master File), available
at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-29-05.pdf.
Over 64,500 organizations received their
recognition of exemption in the most recent year available. See Dep't of the Treasury,
Internal
Revenue
Service
Data
Book
2004
Publication
55B
(2005),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04db21 eo.xls.
This number can understate as well as overstate the number of U.S. charities. Congress
exempts churches and small public charities (generally gross receipts of less than $5000)
from having to register in order to obtain recognition of tax exemption under Internal
Revenue Code § 501(c)(3), and exempts churches and small public charities (generally gross
receipts of less than $25,000) from having to file the annual Form 990. The IRS estimates
that for 2006, a total of 648,600 returns will be filed by 501(c)(3) organizations (407,400
Forms 990; 151,300 Forms 990-EZ, available to organizations with income and assets below
modest thresholds; and 89,900 Forms 990-PF, filed by private foundations). See Principles
of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs., intro., reporter's note 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
The number of exempt organizations could drop precipitously as the IRS adjusts its
Business Master File to reflect a new requirement--effective for years beginning after
2006-that small organizations file an annual notice of their continued existence (and
minimal other information). Failure to file either the appropriate Form 990 or this notice for
three consecutive years will result in revocation of exemption. The new statute additionally
requires notification when an exempt organization terminates its existence. See I.R.C. §§
6033, 6652, 7428 (2001). This process will clarify whether the many "missing" Forms 990
and 990-EZ are attributable to small size or to cessation of activities (or ignorance of filing
obligations).
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nonprofit organizations.
As Peter Dobkin Hall observed, "[T]he
dramatically increased number of nonprofits has created an enormous
demand for competent trustees-a demand that far exceeds the population
of those with either trustee experience or an understanding of traditional
73
trusteeship values."
How do nonprofit directors learn what to do? While there is no single
route to board membership, to some degree service on lesser boards is a
stepping stone for more important (more visible) boards. 74 In effect, the
smaller nonprofits serve as the farm system for developing directorial
talent. In addition, corporate grant making and other external pressures
have led nonprofits to adopt more businesslike practices; the arrival of
business executives on nonprofit boards furthers the importation of business
norms.
Unfortunately, one cannot automatically conclude that large and
established nonprofits have boards that focus on governance. Membership
on the boards of some cultural and other high status, donation reliant
organizations depends on generous monetary contributions-notoriously,
some even have a known "price list."175 It is even more likely that in small
or less connected nonprofit organizations, new board members know little
about what they are supposed to do. With the recent emphasis on
governance and the proliferation of information on the Internet, new and
prospective board members can find abundant advice. Among the best
practices urged in both the business and nonprofit sectors is that new and
continuing board members receive orientation and training-not just in
fiduciaries' legal obligations but also in their governance responsibilities,
such as appreciating the appropriate roles of the board and the staff, the
importance of asking questions and offering constructive criticism, and
contributing to policy and strategic development. 76 But the push for peer
77
regulation has also been criticized.

73. Hall, supra note 70, at 137.
74. See id. at 140-41.

75. See, e.g., Lisa Gubernick, Buying Your Way on to a Board, Wall St. J., May 7, 1999,
at W1.
76. For peer- or self-regulatory ethical guides in the United States, see, for example, BBB
Wise Giving Alliance, Standards for Charity Accountability (2003), available at
http://www.give.org/standards/spring03standards.pdf; Md. Ass'n of Nonprofit Orgs., Standards
for Excellence: An Ethics and Accountability Code for the Nonprofit Sector (2007), available at
Minn,
http://www.marylandnonprofits.org/html/standards/documents/Booket507Revised.pdf,
Council of Nonprofits, Principles and Practices for Nonprofit Excellence (2005), available
-practices.pdf
Ass'n of Fundraising Prof'ls,
at http://www.mncn.org/info/principles-and
Code of Ethical Principles and Standards of Professional Practice (2004),
Evangelical
http://www.afpnet.org/ka/ka-3.cfm?contentitem-id=1 068&folderid=897;
Council for Fin. Accountability, Seven Standards of Responsible Stewardship,
http://www.ecfa.org/Content.aspx?PageName=7Standards (last visited Sept. 19, 2007); Indep.
Sector, Compendium of Standards, Codes, and Principles of Nonprofit and Philanthropic
(last
Organizations, http://www.independentsector.org/issues/accountability/standards2.htm
visited Sept. 19, 2007). Among the many guides available in the United Kingdom, see
ACEVO, Charity Trustee Networks, ICSA & NCVO, Good Governance: A Code for the
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A recent comprehensive survey, by the Urban Institute's Francie
Ostrower, found,
Only a minority of boards were very active when it came to most of
the activities we asked about, including fundraising (29 percent),
monitoring the organization's programs and services (32 percent),
monitoring the board's own performance (17 percent), planning for the
future (44 percent), community relations (27 percent), and
educating the
78
public about the organization and its mission (23 percent).
The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, a group assembled by the charity
trade association Independent Sector, appointed an Advisory Committee on
Self-Regulation to help develop recommendations on this subject. In early
2007, the panel posted the committee's revised draft set of thirty-one
principles for effective practice. 79 These draft principles are grouped into
five categories: (1) facilitating legal compliance and public disclosure, (2)
effective governance, (3) strong financial oversight, (4) responsible
fundraising practices, and (5) two staff principles regarding risk
management practices and adoption of a code of ethics.8 0 The panel is
soliciting public comment on this draft, and expects to issue its final report
in fall 2007.
A recent (although pre-Sarbanes-Oxley) study of the actual practice of
service on boards of New York City social-service nonprofits confirmed the
benefits of board training and experience:
Activity levels are consistently higher across all three categories [meeting
attendance, hours worked, service on committees] for board members
who also receive orientation and training. In terms of tenure, we continue
to find higher activity levels among board members with longer tenures.
All activities are significantly higher for board members with more than
two years of experience .... Attendance rates peak for the middle tenure
group. As board members move beyond ten years of experience, their
attendance declines some-although not to the point of the newest

Voluntary
and
Community
Sector
(2005),
available
at
http://www.unipol.leeds.ac.uk/Media/PDF/GoodGovernance thecode.pdf.
For a laudable example of transparency, see Ford Found., Who We Are,
http://www.fordfound.org/aboutl (last visited Sept. 19, 2007), which sets forth the Ford
Foundation's articles of incorporation, bylaws, committee charters and membership,
standards of independence, trustee codes of ethics, staff codes of conduct and ethics,

procedures for approving affiliated grants, and procedures for the receipt, retention, and
treatment of complaints regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, and auditing
matters. See also Nature Conservancy, About Us, http://www.nature.org/aboutus/leadership
(last visited Sept. 19, 2007).

77. See Ian Dawson & Alison Dunn, Governance Codes of Practicein the Not-for-Profit
Sector, 14 Corp. Governance 33 (2006).
78. Francie Ostrower, Urban Inst., Nonprofit Governance in the United States: Findings
on Performance and Accountability from the First National Representative Study 12 (2007).
79. Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Thirty One Principles for Effective Practice (2d ed.
2007), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/selfreg/All-Principles-Revised.pdf.
80. See id.
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members. However, participation in committees does not decline, and in
81
fact, total time on board work increases.
c. Conflict of Interest Transactions
Nonprofit

governance

overall

might

be

improved

through

the

development of a cadre of "professional" directors (often retired
executives), who can take their expertise from organization to organization,
as is increasingly true of nonprofit executives. 82 Some even suggest paying
nonprofit board members for their time and talent. 83 However, most charity
board members serve without compensation-other than expensesalthough institutional trustees of charitable trusts are normally paid for their
84

services, and board members of many foundations are compensated.
Ostrower's survey concluded, "We generally found no indication that
compensating trustees promotes higher levels of board engagement. Boards
that compensate were not more or less likely to be actively engaged in
financial oversight, setting policy, planning, monitoring programs, or
evaluating the CEO/executive director," and "[c]ompensation was
negatively associated with levels of board activity in fundraising,
community relations, and educating the public about the organization and
its mission .... However, compensation was positively associated with

81. Alan G. Hevesi & Ira Millstein, Nonprofit Governance in New York City 46 (2002),
available
at
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/opm/Nonprofit%20Govemance%201n%20New%2
OYork%2OCity.pdf. The report added, "Advocacy, personal giving, and planning all
continue to increase after the tenth year." Id. at 47.
82. This term traces back to Joseph Barr, who defines "professional director" to be "a
man ... who spends all his time in the discharge of his responsibilities as a director of
various publicly held corporations." Joseph W. Barr, From the Boardroom: The Role of the
ProfessionalDirector,Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1976, at 18, 18. This definition excludes
those employed as chief executives of their own firms, with possibly reciprocal board
service. Compare Barr's view with the concept of "professional outside director" as used by
Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, who proposed that institutional investors collectively
should have the right to seats on the boards of corporations whose stock they own; the
professional directors would have "portfolios" of, say, six directorships. See Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 883-92 (1991). But see Cox, supra note 49 (criticizing the
professional outside director theory).
83. See ABA Coordinating Comm. on Nonprofit Governance, Guide to Nonprofit
Corporate Governance in the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley 45 (2005) [hereinafter ABA,
Sarbanes-Oxley Guide]; see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 330 cmt. b(l),
reporter's notes 1-6 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); Ralph E. DeJong & Michael W.
Peregrine, Director Compensation Plansfor Nonprofits: Addressing the Key Legal Issues,
30 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 29 (2000).
84. See Ostrower, supra note 78, at 11 (finding that only two percent of surveyed public
charities compensated board members, but that the percent increased with size, reaching ten
percent in charities having expenses of over $40 million). For data on private foundation
compensation, see Elizabeth T. Boris, Loren Renz, Asmita Barve, Mark A. Hager & George
Hobor, Urban Inst., Found. Ctr. & Philanthropic Research Inc., Foundation Expenses and
Compensation: How Operating Characteristics Influence Spending (2006), available at
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/31128 lFoundationReport-final.pdf.
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attendance at board meetings, and this relationship held even after controls
for other variables." 85 Moreover, she observed,
We did not find evidence that compensating trustees help[s] nonprofits
attract board members with particular expertise. Boards that compensate
were actually less likely to have members with professional backgrounds
or expertise in management, law, or accounting, and no more or less
likely to have members with expertise in the organization's field of
activity. Furthermore, compensation
was not associated with achieving
86
greater racial or ethnic diversity.
Query whether compensating governing board members would erode the
current corporate standard for breach of the duty of care from gross
negligence 87 to simple negligence. After all, simple negligence is the legal
standard that applies to lawyers, doctors, and other service professionalsand, indeed, to corporate agents generally 88-as well as, traditionally, to
trustees of private and charitable trusts.
Concerns generally about financial dealings between charities and their
insiders-directors, officers, and other key persons-arise more commonly
over compensation for executives, and over transactions for goods and
services-other than board services-with members of the governing body.
(Importantly, the subset of charities dubbed "private foundations" by
federal tax law presents compliance issues only with respect to the payment
of compensation, because all other transactions with insiders are
prohibited. 89) Ostrower's survey found conflict of interest transactions to
be extensive, growing with charity size:
Overall, 21 percent of nonprofits reported buying or renting goods,
services, or property from a board member or affiliated company during
the previous two years. Among nonprofits with more than $10 million in
annual expenses, however, the figure climbs to more than 41 percent.
Note, however, that among those nonprofits that say they did not engage
in transactions with board members or affiliated companies fully 75
percent also say they do not require board members to disclose their

85. Ostrower, supra note 78, at 11.
86. Id.
87. See infra Part I.F.
88. Deborah DeMott, the reporter for the ALI's Restatement (Third) of Agency, recently
noted, "An actively debated question is whether the extensive body of Delaware caselaw
applicable to directors applies to officers as well." Deborah A. DeMott, Inside the Corporate
Veil: The Characterand Consequences of Executives' Duties 16 (Duke Law Sch. Legal
Stud., Working Paper No. 112, 2006). She explained,
It may seem incongruous that agents situated higher in a corporation's
hierarchy would be subject to a lower standard of care (gross negligence) that [sic]
the standard applicable to ordinary agents and employees. The incongruity stems
from two factors. First, the more elevated an agent's position within a hierarchy,
the higher the expectations for the quality of the agent's performance. Second
(and relatedly), the higher the agent's position, the greater the detrimental impact
that may follow from the agent's failure to act with care. Id. at 17.
89. I.R.C. § 4941 (2001). For a full discussion of interested transactions, see Principles
of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 330 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
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financial interests in entities doing business with the organization, and
thus, respondents may have been unaware of transactions that do exist.90
Specifically, this study found,
According to respondent reports, among nonprofits engaged in
financial transactions, most obtained goods at market value (74 percent),
but a majority (51 percent) did report that they obtained goods below
market cost. Under 2 percent reported paying above market cost. Keep
in mind, too, that these are self-reports, and thus, if anything, the figures
are likely to underreport transactions resulting in obtaining goods at
above market value or at market value and overreport transactions
resulting in obtaining goods below market cost.9 1
Moreover,
smaller nonprofits were considerably more likely than larger ones to
obtain goods and services from board members at below market cost: 58
percent of nonprofits with under $100,000 in expenses obtained goods or
services at below market cost from a board member, but the percentage
drops to a low of 24 percent among nonprofits with over $40 million in
expenses. The percentage of nonprofits that received goods or services at
market value, in contrast, was over 70 percent among nonprofits of every
92
size.
Finally, forty-five percent of those charities engaged in business
transactions with board members reported that "it would be at least
somewhat difficult were they prohibited from purchasing or renting goods
' '93
from board members, but only 17 percent said it would be very difficult.
D. Group Authority, Individual Responsibility
1. What the Law Requires
a. Group Responsibility: Board and Committees
The governing board (and each board committee) makes decisions as a
group. Unlike a cotrustee of a charitable trust (whose settlor does not
constitute the cotrustees as a board), a single member of a multimember
nonprofit corporate board, without board authorization, has no power to act
94
for the organization.

90. Ostrower, supra note 78, at 8.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Canfield, I N.W. 261, 270 (Minn. 1879) ("The separate action,
individually, of the persons comprising such governing body, is not the action of the
constituted body of men clothed with corporate powers."). As for cotrustees functioning as a
board, see Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320 cmt. b(1) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
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There is little law that translates the individual fiduciary duties into group
responsibilities. 95 Some commentators put weight on the duty of loyalty,
expressed in the statutes as the director's duty to act in ways he or she
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. 96 More
helpfully, trust law explicitly requires cotrustees to cooperate with each
other in the exercise of their duty of care. 97 The draft ALI Nonprofit
Principles endorse, for all types of charities, the trust law's imposition of an
98
obligation of cooperation on co-fiduciaries.
At the same time, commentary in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
provides that a cotrustee's "duty to participate in administering the trust
99
does not require an equal level of effort or activity by each co-trustee."
Accordingly, that comment continues, cotrustees may decide "(short of
constituting delegation) to allow one or more of the cotrustees to carry more
of the burden in regard to various matters, for example, by initiating,
analyzing, reporting, and making recommendations for reasonably
informed action by all of the trustees." 100 However, trustees may not
"'divid[e]' the trusteeship or its functions in a manner that is not authorized
by the terms of the trust."10 1 Similarly, the draft ALl Nonprofit Principles
comment, "[I]t is impermissible for a board member of a corporate charity
to delegate the responsibilities to be informed and to participate in
102
deliberation."'
A great deal of board work occurs in committees. 10 3 Nonprofit
corporation statutes typically prohibit a committee of the board from taking
four specific actions: (1) authorizing distributions; (2) approving (or
proposing to members) action that must be approved by members, such as
dissolution, merger, or the sale, pledge or transfer of all or substantially all
of the corporation's assets; (3) electing, appointing or removing directors,
or filling vacancies on the board or any board committee; and (4) adopting,
95. In their appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in the Disney litigation
argued that the chancery court erred by applying a director-by-director analysis rather than a
collective analysis, the opposite of the position they argued to the chancery court. The
supreme court castigated the plaintiffs for "taking the trial court to task for adopting the very
analytical approach that they themselves used in presenting their position," and further found
that they failed to show "how such a collective analysis would yield a different result." In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55 (Del. 2006).
96. See supra Part I.A.
97. Specifically, as to a charitable trust with multiple trustees, "except as otherwise
provided by the terms of the trust, each co-trustee has a duty, and also the right, of active,
prudent participation in the performance of all aspects of the trust's administration. Implicit
in this requirement of prudent participation is a duty of reasonable cooperation among the
trustees." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 81 cmt. c (2007).
98. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320 cmt. a(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
99. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 81 cmt. c (2007).
100. Id.
101. Id.

102. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320 cmt. a(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
103. See supra Part I.C.
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amending, or repealing the articles or bylaws. Otherwise, what decisions
committees may make can be set forth in the organizational documents and
in the board policies (including committee resolutions and charters). 0 4 The
full board always can reject a decision of a committee, subject to any rights
of third parties. 0 5 Even when committees exercise board power, the non10 6
committee board members must still exercise their fiduciary duties.
While delegation to committees allows directors to focus on key areas, the
board retains oversight obligations in addition to its responsibility for
making decisions reserved to the board by law, the organizational
documents, or board policy.
As described in the 2007 draft ALI Nonprofit Principles, regardless of an
individual's motive for joining the board, included in every charity board
member's duty of care is the obligation to participate appropriately in
governance. This generally requires each board member to review the
material distributed to the board, attend meetings, ask questions, participate
in deliberations, and cast informed votes. While an individual board
member may reasonably rely on the efforts of those to whom delegation has
been properly made, in order to rely on reports, the member must actually
review them, whether by reading them or attending a presentation of them.
b. Who Is Really on the Board?
State statutes impose a minimum governing board size on nonprofit
corporations, but no state imposes a maximum size. Notably, section 8.03
of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act requires a minimum of
three directors, but about a dozen states-including Delaware-recognize a
single-director nonprofit corporation. 10 7 A nonprofit corporation may
incorporate in a jurisdiction that permits the desired minimum board0 8size,
and then register to do business in another state or states of operation.
Statutes provide few criteria for board membership, requiring, usually,
only that the occupant must be an individual and of a specified minimum
age. Additional reasonable criteria for board membership may be included
in the organizational documents.
A charity may condition board
membership on such ideological characteristics as membership in the
organization or adherence to a certain philosophy, and on such performance
104. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). One
issue in Disney related to whether only the full board, rather than just the compensation
committee, could set the financial terms of the contract with incoming president Michael
Ovitz. Compensation can be a sensitive topic for many exempt organizations, particularly
charities, and the visibility of the Form 990 suggests that the full board at least should be
aware of the compensation it pays to directors, officers, and top executives before the public.

105. The one exception is for decisions made by a special litigation committee, because
such a body determines whether to permit a derivative suit to be brought against the board.
106. See Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.25(f) (1987)

("The creation of,

delegation of authority to, or action by a committee does not alone constitute compliance by
a director with the standards of conduct described in section 8.30.").
107. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 14 1(b) (2007).
108. See Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 15.01 (1987).
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characteristics as experience in a particular industry, satisfactory
performance as a board member, and attendance at a certain number or
percentage of meetings. In addition, a charity might properly require each
board member to make (or raise) a minimum annual financial contribution.
The organization may also consider the desirability of including
representatives of its various stakeholders, and the value of diversity in
board membership.
State statutes not infrequently provide for certain designated public
officials or others to hold ex officio or other status-based (e.g., student)
positions on the boards of public utilities, public agencies (including boards
of regents for state systems of higher education), and licensing and other
regulatory or quasi-regulatory bodies. The consequence of the designation
"ex officio" is that the identity of the board member changes as the holder
of the position changes or as the status of the holder otherwise changes.
Statutorily mandated nonprofit board positions for governmental officials
are often designated as nonvoting. General nonprofit corporation statutes,
however, rarely recognize the possibility of nonvoting directors. 10 9 (By
contrast, as discussed in Part I.E, a nonprofit may have nonvoting members
of the organization.) Many state statutes do provide that a board committee
may include non-board members if they have no vote;" 0 and a few state
statutes provide that certain key committees (e.g., the executive committee)
may contain only board members."'I The legal responsibilities and liability
of a nonvoting board member have not been addressed in the case law; it
would be helpful for nonprofit corporation law to declare affirmatively that
the term "director" means only those with voting power.
The 2007 draft of the Principles of Nonprofit Organizations concludes,
"Essentially, 'if you're on the board, you're on the hook.""' 12 Some states
permit the founder of a nonprofit corporation to include a provision in the
articles of incorporation requiring the assent of the founder or another
specified person or body to all or some corporate decisions, or the vesting
109. For an example of one that does, see the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law,
which provides, "The certificate of incorporation or the by-laws may provide that any one or
more officers shall be ex-officio members of the board, with voting rights unless specified
otherwise." N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 713(d) (McKinney 2002). By contrast, Texas's
revised nonprofit corporation statute contains the opposite presumption. Texas Business
Organizations Code Annotated section 22.210(c) reads, "An ex officio member is not
entitled to vote unless the certificate of formation or bylaws authorize the member to vote.
An ex officio member of the board who is not entitled to vote does not have the duties or
liabilities of a director provided by this chapter." Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 22.210(c)
(Vernon 2006).
110. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 611.56(1) (2006) ("Any committee under this section may
include one or more nonvoting members who are not directors.").
111. Interestingly, the IRS's regulations under Internal Revenue Code § 4958-which
taxes certain insiders on "excess benefit transactions" with exempt charities-defines the
category of covered persons to include, among others, "any individual serving on the
governing body of the organization who is entitled to vote on any matter over which the
governing body has authority." Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c)(1) (2006).
112. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320 cmt. a(l) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
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of authority over certain issues in a specified person or body. Such a
"sterilization option" might be desirable for some membership or religious
organizations in order to retain control over certain issues by the
membership or hierarchy.113
For example, section 8.01(c) of the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act provides,
The articles may authorize a person or persons to exercise some or all
of the powers which would otherwise be exercised by a board. To the
extent so authorized any such person or persons shall have the duties and
responsibilities of the directors, and the directors shall be relieved to that
1
extent from such duties and responsibilities. 14
Section 8.12 of the 2006 proposed revision to the Model Act expands on
this concept by allowing the bylaws-not just the articles-to create such a
designated body. Specifically, this proposed provision reads, in its entirety,
as follows:
(a)

Some, but less than all, of the powers, authority or functions of
the board of directors of a nonprofit corporation under this [act]
may be vested by the articles of incorporation or bylaws in a
designated body.

(b) The provisions of this chapter and other provisions of law on the
rights, duties and liabilities of the board of directors or directors
individually also apply to any designated body of a nonprofit
corporation and to the members of a designated body
individually. The provisions of this chapter and other provisions
of law on the manner of acting of the board of directors also
apply to any designated body in the absence of an applicable rule
in the articles of incorporation, bylaws or internal operating rules
of the designated body,
(c) To the extent the powers, authority, or functions of the board of
directors have been vested in a designated body, the directors are
relieved from their duties and liabilities with respect to those
powers, authority, and functions.] 15
In the absence of commentary in the Exposure Draft, however,
significant open questions remain. What does it mean to say "[s]ome, but
less than all, of the powers" of the board can be assigned to a designated
body? Assuming the board has the power to amend the bylaws or even the
articles without member approval (or if there are no members), and the
board itself establishes such a body, can the board thus divest itself of legal

113. Victoria B. Bjorklund, James J. Fishman & Daniel L. Kurtz, New York Nonprofit
Law and Practice: With Tax Analysis 336-37, 336 n.43 (1997).
114. Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.01(c) (1987).
115. Proposed Model Nonprofit Corp. Act, Third Ed. § 8.12 (Exposure Draft 2006),
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL580000/sitesofinterestfiles/MNCAe
xposuredraft.doc. The source note to this provision explains that it is patterned generally
after a Pennsylvania statute, 15 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 5734 (West 1995), and derived from
existing Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.01(c).
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responsibility and liability for some matters? What are the powers and
liabilities of the board and the designated body when both bodies claim
authority over an issue-or both disclaim it?
2. What Occurs in Practice
a. Group Decision Making
A variety of techniques have been developed in the business world to
encourage boards to overcome the natural tendencies toward "group think"
and deference to the better-informed inside directors or those with
perceived expertise.
These techniques include appointing a lead
independent director (when the CEO is the board chair), having meetings of
the independent board members separate from the inside directors,
designating a board member to act as a devil's advocate, and, when called
for, undertaking a forensic audit. More worrisome for many charities, not
all board members come with the same expectations of performing their
individual duties.
b. Identifying "the Board" and the "Members " of a Committee
It can be surprisingly difficult to ascertain the composition of the
governing board of many nonprofit organizations because of the
proliferation of honorary and special titles. The draft black letter of the ALI
Nonprofit Principles emphasizes, "The governing board must ensure that
those persons who are responsible for the affairs of the charity are clearly
identified."'116 Comment a(1) adds,
[E]very charity must be able to identify that person or group of persons
endowed with the responsibilities assigned in this Section to the
governing board ...so that all fiduciaries may appreciate their legal

duties, and so that regulators, the charity's constituents (including
members, if any), and the general public know whom to hold
accountable. 117
This information has now become easier to detect from tax filings." 18
Much of the recent management literature on nonprofit board
composition addresses the diversity of board membership in terms of
whether the organization's various stakeholders have a voice, rather than-as is the focus here-on whether each board member conceives of his or

116. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007)
(quoting the second sentence of § 320(a)).
117. Id. § 320 cmt. a(l).
118. Form 990, line 75a, added in 2005, asks, "Enter the total number of officers,
directors, and trustees permitted to vote on organization business at board meetings." I.R.S.
Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.
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her role as encompassing an obligation to attend to governance (as distinct
from fund-raising or other contributions)." 19
The ability of a charity to recruit good board members obviously depends
on what is expected of them-after all, passion alone will not suffice to
discharge the legal obligations described above. 120 Marion Fremont-Smith
observes,
It is not uncommon to elect individuals to serve as directors because of
certain unique contributions they are able to make by virtue of their
particular expertise, standing in the community, or as potential donors. In
many instances it is understood that these individuals will not be expected
to attend meetings or give the affairs
of the charity the degree of attention
12
expected of other board members. 1
She refers to proposals "to redefine the duties of directors to permit what
might be considered a special class that would not be held to the standards
required of others."' 122 However, she believes, "A better solution would be
to provide these individuals with an honorary title or, if the corporation has
members, elect them to that position, rather than diluting the overall
123
standards appropriate for directors."'
Michael Klausner and Jonathan Small recently proposed that the law
recognize a bifurcated board, made up of "governing board members" and
"nongoverning board members."' 124 To these authors, "[a]ll directors
should not be asked or expected to govern," and this expectation "stems
from a misplaced analogy with for-profit boards."' 125 These authors
comment,
In contrast to their counterparts on for-profit boards, directors of
nonprofit organizations are called upon to perform several functions.
Some directors give or raise funds; others provide special expertise;
others maintain ties to an important community; others are there because
their stature serves as a signal that the organization does good work. And
some-perhaps just a few-govern. All of these functions are important,
and the reality is that there is typically a division of labor on a board, a

119. See, e.g., Ostrower & Stone, supra note 53 (surveying studies of gender, race,

ethnicity, age, class, and occupation, and calling for more research on how the actual
activities of different types of board members differ).
120. See Ostrower, supra note 78, at 16 ("The degree of difficulty experienced by the
nonprofit in recruiting new members was negatively associated with levels of board
engagement in every role. This is highly significant because 70 percent of nonprofits say it
is difficult to find board members and 20 percent say it is very difficult.").
121. Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: State and Federal
Law and Regulation 433 (2004).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Michael Klausner & Jonathan Small, Failing to Govern? The Disconnect Between
Theory and Reality in Nonprofit Boards, and How to Fix It, 3 Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev. 42

(2005).
125. Id. at 43.

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76

division that reflects
the varied interests and abilities of those who choose
126
to join a board.
These authors explain, "The objective of the Bifurcated Board structure
is to make the governance role clear to the board members who assume
governance responsibility and to the public, while also continuing to use the
They
board for fundraising and other nongovernance functions."' 127
emphasize that the directors could "choose to govern one year and not
'12 8
govern another, depending on their interest and availability.'
The 2007 draft of the Principles of Nonprofit Organizations, in contrast
to proposals for a designated body or bifurcated board, endorse as better
policy the view that all board members should bear responsibility for
governance. 1 29 The ALI draft comments,
In this age of high expectations for governance, the challenge to the
charity is to bring all board members into the governance effort, or to find
alternative ways to recruit supporters who provide financial and other aid
but are not interested in committing time and energy to governance.
These alternatives offer legal clarity without inviting after-the-fact claims
of "everyone understood that my role was to be limited"-and avoid, at
the extreme, the operation of organizations headed by boards that cede
too much authority to management. This is not to say, however, that all
board members must participate to the same degree in all aspects of
governance. If appropriate, ... a charity may generally assign various
responsibilities to board committees, including an executive committee.
In such a case, board members not serving on the particular committee are
relieved of their fiduciary duties to the charity other than their
responsibility to participate in oversight and for matters specifically
reserved to the board by law, the organizational documents, or board
policy. 130

126. Id. at 44.
127. Id. at 47.
128. Id.
129. Cf Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.19 cmt. d
(1992) (prohibiting "charter amendments that restrict the scope of the duty of care, or permit
directors to specialize over only a limited area of corporate affairs").
130. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320 cmt. b(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007) (citations omitted); see also id. § 315 cmt. b(3), c, § 325 cmt. b. The American Bar
Association Coordinating Committee on Nonprofit Governance recommends that the
organization find ways other than board service to involve donors or fund-raisers in the
organization:
In the wake of current recommendations for smaller, more effective "working"
boards, some nonprofits may need to review their assumptions about the
appropriateness of having large or prospective donors/fundraisers serve on their
boards. If monetary contribution or fundraising is a primary reason for certain
board positions, are there other structures, such as an advisory board or fundraising committees[,] that could fulfill such purpose without the increased time and
potential liability demands of board service? Are all board members willing and
able to make the necessary commitment to serve as active overseers of corporate
operations, including through active committee involvement?
ABA, Sarbanes-Oxley Guide, supra note 83, at 21.
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To avoid the problems of an overly large board, one technique, when
permitted by law, is to use a small board supplemented by non-board
committee members.
This spreads the work, brings in a variety of
perspectives, and recruits potential board members.
Nonprofit
organizations commonly bring in outsiders to help with committee work.131
The American Bar Association's Guidebook for Directors of Nonprofit
Corporationscomments, "[E]ven a committee of total outsiders, named to
perform some specific function, can be formed at the discretion of the board
of directors, except that in most states, the board may not delegate any
board-level power to such non-director committees." 132 Note that while the
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act is silent on the subject of
advisory bodies, the 2006 draft proposed revision expands section 8.25,
dealing with board committees, to clarify the legality of advisory
committees. New subsection (h) would read, "A nonprofit corporation may
create or authorize the creation of one or more advisory committees whose
133
members need not be directors."'
Separately, it is common for a nonprofit's chief executive to serve as a
member of the board, albeit often without a vote. 134 If the vote is the legal
indicium of what distinguishes a "real" board member from an honorary or
advisory member, the law might diverge from all parties' expectations, and
surprise, if not offend, the many executive directors that serve on their
boards without voting authority. On the other hand, Francie Ostrower's
survey found it more likely that the executive director would have a vote if
the board includes members from the business community, and that
[h]aving the CEO/executive director as a voting board member was
negatively associated with having an outside audit, a conflict of interest
policy, a document retention policy, and a whistleblower policy ....
[O]ur study suggests that conflating executive director and board
positions in this way detracts from the board carrying out its stewardship

131. See Jeffrey L. Callen, April Klein & Daniel Tinkelman, Board Composition,
Committees, and Organizational Efficiency: The Case of Nonprofits, 32 Nonprofit &
Voluntary Q. 493, 503 (2004) (finding that, "[d]epending on the committee, up to 64% of
the respondents had at least one non-board member serving on committees"); BoardSource,
Nonprofit
Governance
Index
2004:
Executive
Summary
8
(2005),
http://www.boardsource.org/di.asp?document-id=424 (noting that 69% of respondents had

non-board members serving on committees).
132. ABA Section of Bus. Law, Nonprofit Corps. Comm., Guidebook for Directors of
Nonprofit Corporations 49 (George W. Overton & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey, eds., 2d ed.
2002) [hereinafter ABA, Guidebook for Nonprofit Directors].
133. See Proposed Model Nonprofit Corp. Act, Third Ed. § 8.25(h) (Exposure Draft 2006),

http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL580000/sitesofinterest-files/MNCAexp
osuredraft.doc; see also infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (discussing the use of a
"strong" executive committee).

134. See Jonathan A. Small, Should the Executive Director Serve on Its Board? (New
York, Oct. 19, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Nonprofit Forum, on file

with the Fordham Law Review).
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responsibilities, and that nonprofits should think carefully before adopting
this corporate practice. 135

c. Board Size and Composition and the Use of Board Committees
The business world provides an interesting comparison on issues of
board size and composition. According to a leading industry study, the
average board size of Standard & Poor's 500 companies "leveled off to
10.7 four years ago and remains there today. This is a small enough size to
work efficiently as a group but large enough to staff needed committees.
Practically speaking, it seems unlikely that boards can grow much
smaller."' 136 The report notes a five-year trend toward smaller boards, with
81% having twelve or fewer directors. 137 The report additionally found,
"On 39% of S&P 500 company boards, the CEO is the only nonindependent director, an increase from 27% in 2001"; and that the "CEO
and chairman roles are separated at one-third of companies, a trend that has
increased from 29% last year and 26% in 2001." 1138 Very small boards
39
typically exist in the business world only in closely held corporations. 1
Business corporations rarely have the very large boards often found in
arts and cultural organizations, higher education, and other types of
charities. Boards of commercial-type charities are most likely to resemble
business boards in size and operation. 140 In preliminary analysis, the
National Center for Charitable Statistics (a project of the Center on
Nonprofits and Philanthropy at the Urban Institute) found that in the period
from 1998 to 2000 public charities had a mean board size of just under
eleven (although that study excluded organizations with board sizes
14 1
exceeding seventy).
Ostrower's survey examined board size and composition. Among many
other findings, she observed that a
facet of board composition that varies considerably with size is the
inclusion of members who are relatives of other board members, a
135. Ostrower, supra note 78, at 5-6.
136. Spencer Stuart Board Index, The Changing Profile of Directors 12 (2006), available
at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI-2006.pdf
137. Id.
138. Id. at 19.
139. See supra Part I.B.
140. Notably, the Governance Institute's 2005 Biennial Survey of Hospitals and Health
Systems found a median board size of thirteen for not-for-profit acute care hospitals, seven
members for government hospitals, and fifteen members for community hospitals and for
Increased
hospital systems. Governance Inst., E-Briefing on Raising the Bar:
(2005),
Performance
and
Board
Transparency,
Accountability,
http://www.governanceinstitute.com/cd 550.aspx?contentlD = .
141. Specifically, the National Center for Charitable Statistics' data showed that fewer
than 7% reported one or two board members; 29% reported three to five board members;
26% reported six to ten board members; 24% reported eleven to twenty board members; and
13% reported more than twenty board members. Nat'l Ctr. for Charitable Statistics, What Is
(2002),
of
Directors?
Average
Board
of
the
the
Size
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/faq/detail.php?linkID= 175&category=8&xreflD=2578.
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characteristic more common [i]n small organizations and in cultural
organizations. Fully 26 percent of boards of nonprofits with under
$100,000 in expenses have members who are related to one another, as do
19 percent of boards of nonprofits with $100,000 to $500,000. The
percentage drops to 15 percent for the next two size groups and down to
10 percent for nonprofits with $10
million to $40 million and 11 percent
142
for those with over $40 million.
She added, "Even after taking size into account, boards of cultural
organizations are also more likely to include relatives, a finding consistent
with the greater likelihood of donors to culture to be couples rather than
individuals and the propensity of cultural boards to maintain family
connections."' 143 She separately found, "An emphasis on friendship or
acquaintanceship with current board members had a negative association
with activity in every board role except fundraising (where it had no
44
impact)."1
Committee composition can be more revealing than composition of the
board as a whole. One study of the board and committee composition of
large U.S. charities observed, "[T]he motive for selecting a person to the
board need not be the same as the reason for selecting that person to serve
on a particular committee." 14 5 This study found that major donors make up
varying percentages of key committees: fundraising (31% of committee
members are major donors), nominating (22.4%), executive committee
(21.2%), audit committee (14%), and program committee (14.8%). By
contrast, board members with professional skills serve primarily on the
audit committee (64.9%), investment committee (62.9%), and finance
committee (52.1%), and are least represented on the fundraising committee
(34.8%) and nominating committee (31.4%).146 These authors conclude
that their findings "do not support the hypothesis that major donors gain
disproportionate membership on monitoring committees. In fact, major
donors appear to be underrepresented on monitoring committees (e.g.,
147
audit) by comparison to their representation on the board."'
A committee and the rules governing it may be established by the
bylaws, a board resolution, a committee charter, or some combination of
these. In any case, the documents should specify not only what the
committee is to do, but also how it is to keep the board informed of its
activities.
Committees exercising board powers (e.g., the executive
committee) should keep minutes of their meetings and report regularly to
the board. As the Business Roundtable explained,
Regardless of whether the board grants plenary power to its committees
with respect to particular issues or prefers to take recommendations from
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Ostrower, supra note 78, at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 16.
Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, supra note 131, at 503.
Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 516.
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its committees, committees should keep the full board informed of their
activities. Corporations benefit greatly from the collective wisdom of the
between
entire board acting as a deliberative body, and the interaction
48
committees and the full board should reflect this principle. 1
The draft ALl Nonprofit Principles comment that a charity with an
unavoidably large board can improve governance by adopting a "strong"
executive committee. 149 The ALI draft explains the trade-offs of using an
executive committee:
In an organization with a large board, an executive committee is more
nimble, being able to work more closely with management and to act on
behalf of the charity when it is not practical to assemble the full board for
action. However, like the other committees, an executive committee may
not usurp the board, and the governing board may reverse (or ratify) the
executive committee's action. Moreover, the organization should proceed
carefully to ensure that the executive committee does not have too much
power. Some issues are so central to the charity, or so potentially
controversial, that they should be decided by the full board following
presentation by the executive (or other) committee of its recommended
150
action.
The ALI commentary advises,
A clear definition of this relationship is important to prevent the executive
committee from usurping the power of the board and to reduce the
possibility of power struggles over which matters may properly be
handled by the executive committee. In the absence of such a formal
delegation, the charity with a large board likely will fall into such a
structure informally-indeed, its governance process would be
overwhelmed if every one of its board members actually participated
actively in governance-but the working group would be less likely to
keep the board fully informed and the allocation of legal responsibility
would be less clear, increasing the risk to the less participatory board
1
members. 15
The ABA's
recommends,

Guidebook for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations

148. Bus. Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance 26 (2005), available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/CorporateGovPrinciples.pdf.
149. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320 cmt. g(3) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007). The draft recommends,
A charity with a large board that wants to use a strong executive committee...
should set forth in its organizational documents an explicit provision authorizing
the delegation of the board's functions and obligations to an executive committee.
This will clarify that the non-executive committee members' duty of care is
limited to oversight of the executive committee and to decisionmaking on those
matters specifically reserved to the board by law, the organizational documents, or
board policy.
Id. § 325 cmt. b(4) (citation omitted).
150. Id. § 325 cmt. b(2) (citation omitted).
151. Id. § 320 cmt. g(3).
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If the executive committee exercises a substantial amount of the power
of the board, the board as a whole should periodically evaluate whether
the board is meeting its fiduciary obligations through such delegations,
opportunity to
and whether the board effectively oversees and has 1the
52
provide input regarding executive committee decisions.
The Guidebook adds that a large board that delegates significant power to
an executive committee "should also periodically evaluate whether the

corporation would benefit from having a smaller board that meets more
frequently." 153
The ALI Nonprofit Principles draft also addresses the problems of a
charity having too small a board: "At the other extreme, because all

charities, regardless of size, must be organized and operated for charitable
rather than private purposes, a minimum number of three unrelated
individuals is usually necessary for charity governance that protects the
public interest."' 154 Best practices might require a board larger than
three. 155
E. Are CharityMembers Shareholder-Substitutes?
1. What the Law Requires

Modern U.S. state statutes merely permit-but no longer require, as

many once did-nonprofit organizations to have members. 15 6

Member

control is common in the "mutual benefit" nonprofit, such as a labor
organization, social club, or business league. 15 7 Most charities and social
152. ABA, Guidebook for Nonprofit Directors, supra note 132, at 52.
153. Id.
154. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320 cmt. g(3) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007). Comment g(3) adds,
The American Law Institute has previously recommended that "small publicly
held corporations and large publicly held corporations that are majority-owned by
a single person, a family group, or a control group ...should have at least three
directors who are free of significant relationships with the corporation's senior
executives. The number three is chosen... in the belief that it is the number of
Even family
directors necessary to attain a critical mass on the board."
foundations, which might function more like donor-advised funds than the typical
charity, should consider the benefits of opening up board deliberation and
oversight to an outside perspective.
Id. (citation omitted).
155. See BBB Wise Giving Alliance, Standards for Charity Accountability, supra note 76
(calling for a board of at least five voting members).
156. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of
Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 Or. L. Rev. 829, 829-30 (2003).
157. Compare the legal distinction, described above, in continental European countries
between associations, which are required to have members, and foundations, which have no
members. The association's members, at the "general meeting," normally appoint the board
of directors. For a discussion of how internally democratic an association must be and how
democratic a foundation may be, see Thomas von Hippel, Nonprofit Organizations in
Germany: An Overview (Heidelberg, Germany, July 6-9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript,
presented at the Conference on Comparative Corporate Governance for Nonprofit
Organizations, on file with the Fordham Law Review). Foundations, but not associations,
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welfare organizations, by contrast, have no members, or have members
only in the ceremonial sense, offering affinity but not authority. Unless the
articles or bylaws provide for another selection mechanism, a nonprofit
corporation without members has a self-perpetuating board of directors.
Statutes often simply substitute the word "members" for "shareholders"
where the corresponding business-corporation statute would give oversight
rights to shareholders. Because the term "member" in nonprofit corporate
statutes is defined as those with rights to elect the board of directors, in a
nonprofit lacking members, no stakeholder of the organization other than
the board has any say in such extraordinary decisions as a merger or
liquidation. (As a separate matter, the nonprofit might be required to notify
or obtain the approval of the state attorney general.) Some statutes permit
members to initiate a derivative suit if a minimum number or percentage of
58
members join together to do so.]
Commentary in the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act explains
how membership in a nonprofit differs from traditional stock ownership:
Issuance of a membership, unlike the sale of stock, does not
necessarily involve the sale of something of value. Memberships in
public benefit and religious corporations have no economic value, but
reflect a contribution or a commitment to participate in or support the
organization and its objectives.
Memberships in mutual benefit
corporations may or may not
have
an
economic value depending on the
159
nature of the organization.
Members of a nonprofit organization (unlike members of the board) need
not be individuals. One important use of membership-although beyond
the scope of this essay-is in creating control of a group of affiliated
nonprofit corporations. Thus, a "subsidiary" nonprofit would have a sole
are controlled by a state authority, because foundations have no members. See W. Rainer
Walz, Tax Law Reform as an Instrument to Strengthen the Corporate Governance of the
Nonprofit Sector (Heidelberg, Germany, July 6-9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, presented
at the Conference on Comparative Corporate Governance for Nonprofit Organizations, on
file with the Fordham Law Review). See generally The European Foundation, supra note 1.
158. See James J. Fishman, Improving CharitableAccountability, 62 Md. L. Rev. 218,
257 & n.288 (2003) (describing, among other statutes, Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act section 6.30(a), extending standing to "five percent or more of the voting
power or by fifty members, whichever is less" to file a derivative suit, as well as cases
coming down on both sides of the standing issue).
159. Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 6.02 cmt. (1987). Henry Hansmann coined
the term "nondistribution constraint" as the key legal feature of the nonprofit organization:
A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from
distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it,
such as members, officers, directors, or trustees. By "net earnings" I mean here
pure profits-that is, earnings in excess of the amount needed to pay for services
rendered to their organization; in general, a nonprofit is free to pay reasonable
compensation to any person for labor or capital that he provides, whether or not
that person exercises some control over the organization. It should be noted that a
nonprofit organization is not barred from earning a profit ....
It is only the
distribution of the profits that is prohibited.
Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 Yale L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
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corporate (voting) member that acts as the "parent."' 160 Separately, for tax
reasons relating to the treatment of lobbying and political activity, charities
can be created by or affiliate with other types of nonprofits (such as unions
and trade associations).
2. What Occurs in Practice
In the business corporation, the shareholders own the stock; workers own
their labor; suppliers own their supplies; and lessors (and, in some
economic sense, the lenders) own the factory and equipment. But it is
generally only to the shareholders that the board of directors must account.
After all, shareholders "are the only voluntary constituency whose relation
with the corporation does not come up for periodic renewal"; and
shareholders "are also unique in that their investments are not associated
with particular assets. ' 1 6 1 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman view
the "standard shareholder-oriented model" of the large-scale business
corporation as the social ideal, in contrast to models oriented to the state, to
stakeholders (usually labor), or to managers. 162
But given that
memberships in nonprofits generally lack monetary value and are
nontransferable (except for certain mutual-benefit organizations), is the
implicit analogy in nonprofit corporation law between shareholders and
members apt? And what are we to make of the silence of nonprofit

160. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the Duties of
Parent CorporationsActing as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health Care Systems,
53 Rutgers L. Rev. 979, 984 (2001).
161. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 Yale L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984).
162. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 30, at 441.
In the 1990s, American legal
scholarship focusing on the business sector raised questions of corporate responsibilitywhether corporations owe obligations beyond the wealth maximization of shareholders, to
reach the welfare of workers, suppliers, creditors, and the local community. See Principles of
Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1992). State legislatures expressed
these concerns in "corporate constituency statutes" that permit (or even, in one state, require)
the board to make business decisions taking these other interests into account. See Eric W.
Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 14, 16, 73 (1992). Skeptics see corporate constituency laws as thinly disguised
antitakeover statutes, enacted at the behest of incumbent managers of threatened
corporations. That view finds support in the fact that these corporate constituency statutes
fail to grant standing in court to the newly protected classes. Id. at 83.
Some theorists challenge the view that shareholders have legal rights because the board is
their agent. Notably, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout comment,
Shareholders enjoy special legal rights not because they have some unique claim
on directors, but because they often are in the best position to represent the
interests of the coalition that comprises the firm. Thus, when directors breach
their fiduciary duties and seek to profit personally at the firm's expense,
shareholders sometimes can take legal action on the firm's behalf. As a general
rule, however, the benefits of such derivative actions inure not just to shareholders,
but to all stakeholders. Similarly, shareholders' limited voting rights may operate
to benefit other stakeholders in the firm.
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va.
L. Rev. 247, 289 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
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corporation statutes with respect to the majority of charitable
corporations-those having no members at all?
. The approach of endowing even shareholders with legal oversight has its
critics. While the shareholders of a business corporation elect the members
of the board of directors-and can replace members of the board simply for
misfeasance, or indeed for no reason at all-and while shareholders vote on
certain extraordinary transactions, such as a merger, in the modem
corporation the shareholders actually perform very little monitoring. It is
really only the smaller model of joint enterprise that fits the statutory
paradigm (in the United States at least) of stockholders who control the
board of directors who then oversee management by the officers. In the
larger corporations, any notion of shareholder voice has been discarded,
except for controlling or large minority interests. When the shareholder
loses confidence in management, she can sell the stock (the "Wall Street
walk"). Meanwhile, the stock market signals the value of the corporation,
and of its management. "In the 'market for corporate control,' a buyer
163
might engage in a takeover in order to toss out the bad managers."'
Nor do members of nonprofits-at least of charities-always perform
much oversight; mutual-benefit organizations (such as labor unions,
professional associations, and clubs) are most likely to have active
memberships. Most important, in the absence of specific legislation (such
as applies to labor unions), the terms of membership, including any voting
rights and the manner of voting, are left to each nonprofit to determine.
Members might be disenfranchised or simply uninterested in exercising
oversight. 164
'Aside from the difficulty of compelling the exercise of vigilant oversight,
members might not be the right constituency (if any single one is) on whom
to impose legal duties for overseeing the nonprofit board. 165 Members of a
charity-and even members of some mutual-benefit organizations-rarely
make a financial investment similar to that of capital-supplying
shareholders. Moreover, membership tends to be (although it need not be)
"one man, one vote." Of course, members often are ideologically and
emotionally invested in the organization, but so are other stakeholders of
66
the organization. 1
Over the last few decades, economists, sociologists, and management
specialists have come to appreciate the effects on internal governance of a
nonprofit's multiple stakeholders. The issue is complicated by two typical
problems: the nonprofit's diffusion of mission and dependence on key

163. See Brody, Agents Without Principals,supra note 4, at 476-77.
164. Avner Ben-Ner would improve nonprofit accountability by requiring a nonprofit to
have (active) members. Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefitsfrom the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming
Law and Public Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 Yale L.J. 731, 735-36

(1994).
165. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Takeovers: Regulating the Market
for Mission Control,2006 BYU L. Rev. 1181.

166. See Brody, supra note 17, at 482-88.
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resources. Even for the typical charity, which lacks voting members, the
board is hardly untethered.
Relationships-some voluntary, some
contractual, some political (in the broad sense)-exist within and between
organizations, and between nonprofit organizations and business,
government, and the public. 16 7 Regardless of whether they have voting
rights, nonprofit members have a range of "voice" and "exit" choices; they
can "seek change from within, withhold financial support, cease to
associate with the group, or form a rival group of their own."' 6 8
This discussion suggests that, at least for charities, the law should
proceed cautiously in granting members preferential rights, such as standing
69
1
to challenge fiduciary performance in court.

F. What Really Happens to a Wayward Charity Fiduciary?
1. What the Law Requires
Finally, we reach what some observers lament as the core hypocrisy of
the nonprofit governance legal regime: that the standard of care is
precatory only, because few parties can complain about fiduciary
wrongdoing, and, even when the attorney general or other person with
standing does bring suit, courts will not impose meaningful sanctions.
The poster child for this concern is George Pepperdine. In George
Pepperdine Foundation v. Pepperdine,170 a California appellate court
declared that "[r]eason, justice, equity and law stand aghast at the judgment
proposed by the . . . complaint" of a foundation against its founder and

other board members for causing investment losses of $3 million over
eleven years.' 7 1 As the opinion summarized the complaint, George
Pepperdine completely dominated and controlled the foundation, and the
board "held few and infrequent meetings at which a quorum was seldom
present, and at such meetings nothing was done except to vote approval of
the inter-meeting transactions of President Pepperdine who was also
treasurer and general factotum; in other words, the corporation was George
Pepperdine's other self."' 172 Over the period from 1939 through 1948, the
foundation's investments performed so poorly that the foundation became
insolvent.173 The court at length expressed its disgust with the plaintiff
foundation's position, remarking, in part,
Assuming that the alleged losses were due to the alleged egregious
blunders of the board under the leadership of President Pepperdine, and to
167. See generally Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The ConstitutionalBounds

of the Right ofAssociation, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 821 (2002).
168. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 710 (1990) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
169. See infra Part I.F.
170. 271 P.2d 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).

171. Id. at 605.
172. Id. at 602-03.
173. Id. at 603.
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have been the result of his negligence and of the lack of zealous interest
on the part of the others, why should he be now required to restore to his
corporation what he once gave from his bounty and which was lost solely
by reason of his ignorant or careless reckoning? Although a director of
such a corporation is held to the highest degree 174
of honor and integrity, he
is not personally liable for mistake of judgment.
The court concluded, "If any of such misfortunes encompassed him and
deprived him of his erstwhile powers, should he and his patriotic associates
now be plundered of their personal possessions to fill the never-to-begratified maw of charity?"' 175 While the California Supreme Court later
76
established the authority of a nonprofit organization to sue its directors,'
the "Pepperdine attitude causes one of the larger difficulties in achieving
77
effective supervision over charities." 1
As for addressing breach of fiduciary duty, it is commonly believed that

only the attorney general has standing to take action, but this is not true. In
the first instance, the governing board itself has the obligation to ensure that
trustees or directors (as well as officers and senior executives) perform their
fiduciary duties. In general, breaches of the duty of loyalty present less
ambiguous cases for action than breaches of the duty of care, and the
78
remedies appropriately vary.1
In some cases, even an individual board member must take action. What
the suspecting board member must do will vary with the circumstances.
Draft commentary in the ALI Nonprofit Principles recognizes that, "[i]n the
absence of an express assignment of responsibility by the board (such as by
committee membership), an individual board member has no obligation to
monitor co-fiduciaries, officers, and employees, and does not have the
174. Id. at 604.
175. Id.
176. Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1964).
177. James J. Fishman, Standards of Conductfor Directorsof Nonprofit Corporations,7
Pace L. Rev. 389,413 (1987).
178. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. §§ 350, 360 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007). As described in the commentary,
If necessary to protect the interests of the charity, the governing board should
remove for cause a board member (or officer or senior executive) who breaches
his or her duties. Notably, while dissent is often healthy ... a fiduciary's behavior
can be so hostile that it impedes the proper governance of a charity .

. .

.

Of

course, the charity must abide by any limitations specified by law or in the
organizational documents, such as a provision that only an organization's
members may remove a director they elected, so resort to court might be
necessary.
Moreover, the board must consider enforcement action when necessary to
safeguard the rights of the organization, including, when appropriate, bringing suit
for damages or injunctive relief against wayward fiduciaries. As might be
expected, in most of these cases, the defendant fiduciaries are actually former
board members, officers, or executives, but this is not necessarily the case. A
board that vigorously enforces fiduciary duties, rather than covers up breaches,
both demonstrates the charity's worthiness of public support and enhances the
reputation of the sector.
Id. § 350 cmt. a (citations omitted).
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power (and often the resources) to conduct an investigation of suspected
wrongdoing."1 79 Accordingly,
[t]he burden to take reasonable and appropriate action ordinarily obligates
the board member merely to bring his or her concerns to the attention of
the board or to the appropriate internal body or person charged with initial
oversight for the particular wrongdoing ...unless the process itself is

corrupted. Ultimately, the board
member will usually have done enough
180
if the charity itself takes action.
However, for charities with very small boards or with boards lacking
independence, resignation might not be enough. Consider the "sinking
ship" scenario, when frustrated board members are tempted to quit rather
The draft comment
than fight one or more domineering directors.
concludes that in appropriate cases, a board member must notify the
attorney general or even seek court relief. 18
In rare cases, the law gives a private party standing to sue, but usually on
the grounds of being a person with a special interest to enforce well-defined
rights.1 82 Common law does not traditionally recognize the general right of
third parties to sue to enforce fiduciary duties owed to the charity, other
than, in appropriate cases, to enforce the terms of a restricted gift or
charitable trust. 183 Compare the broad proposal to give mandatory
intervention rights to the founder of a European Foundation.1 84 Aside from
the small percentage of charities that are private foundations, a similar
proposal would have limited effect in the United States. Most U.S. publicly
179. Id. § 350 cmt. b(4).
180. Id.
181. Id. This draft ALI position derives from an influential decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, which declared in a case involving a business corporation, "Directors may
not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and then claim that because they did not see the
misconduct, they did not have a duty to look. The sentinel asleep at his post contributes
nothing to the enterprise he is charged to protect." Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d
814, 822 (N.J. 1981).

182. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
CharitableFiduciaries?,23 J. Corp. L. 655, 672-73 (1998).
183. See Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of
Charitable-DonorStanding, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1183 (2007). The Uniform Trust Code provides
that the "settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the
trust." Unif. Trust Code § 405(c), 7C U.L.A. 486 (2000). The Uniform Trust Code, as of
February 20, 2007, has been adopted in nineteen jurisdictions. This statute does not apply to
a corporate charity, except as it may hold gifts in trust.
184. Article 4.3 (Rights of the Founder) of the European Foundation proposal set forth in
The EuropeanFoundation provides,
The Founder of a European Foundation and also any subsequent donor of a
significant contribution have the right to intervene with the State supervisory
authority if the Board of Directors and/or the Supervisory Board fail to comply
with their responsibilities; the State supervisory authority must produce a
substantive statement on this intervention within 60 days.
The European Foundation, supra note 1, at 121.
Commentary explains that subsequent donors "only have the right to intervene if they
have reason to complain that the Board of Directors and/or the Supervisory Board are not
Id. at 122.
complying with their responsibilities as regards thatperson's gift."
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supported charities are funded primarily by fees for services and
government grants and contracts, rather than by contributions
(much less by
185
a contribution from a single or small number of donors).
Even if a suit involving breach of the duty of care should reach the
merits, plaintiffs will find that they cannot easily successfully challenge
board member conduct in court. Most important, the business judgment
rule shields decisions made in good faith. 186 Moreover, the board is
obviously not expected to exercise oversight of each individual
management action. 187 True, recent Delaware jurisprudence emerging from
185. See I.R.S. Data Release, Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2002, in
Statistics of Income Bulletin, Fall 2005, at 263, 263, 264 fig.B.
186. See generally Evelyn Brody, The Legal Frameworkfor Nonprofit Organizations,in
The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, supra note 6, at 243, 243-66; William T.
Allen, The Corporate Director'sFiduciaryDuty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule
Under U.S. Corporate Law, in Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art
and Emerging Research, supra note 30, at 307-31.
187. In the Principles of Corporate Governance, the ALI acknowledged the difficulty of
distinguishing between "a conscious decision or inexcusable inattentiveness." Principles of
Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.01(c) cmt. c (1992). Bayless
Manning complained, "[A]stonishingly,... given the realities of the way boards operate, the
business judgment rule would not operate at all in respect of fully ninety percent of what
directors are actually engaged in." Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the
Director'sDuty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. Law. 1477, 1494 (1984). Manning
takes "as axiomatic that a director should not be held liable for having failed in his duty of
attention unless his conduct departs significantly from normal expectations of proper
conduct." Id. at 1480. To Manning, the central problem for a director is that "the universe of
all actions not taken is always far greater than the roster of actions taken"; because agenda
setting is the most important thing a board does, the distinction between commission and
omission of specific acts is meaningless and unhelpful. Id. at 1485-86. Manning concluded,
The courts will somehow find a way to alter the interpretation of the business
judgment rule in such a way as to make it produce commonsense results in the
case of reasonably diligent citizens who have been in good faith generally attentive
to their duties as directors over a period of time.
Id. at 1495. Indeed, as the Delaware Chancery Court subsequently ruled in In re Caremark
International, a case involving potential board liability for failing to learn of criminal
activity,
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated
upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation,... only a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exits
[sic]-will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.
Such a test of liability-lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or systematic
failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight-is quite high. But, a
demanding test of liability in the oversight context is probably beneficial to
corporate shareholders as a class, as it is in the board decision context, since it
makes board service by qualified persons more likely, while continuing to act as a
stimulus to good faith performance of duty by such directors.
In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). As modified to emphasize
intentionality, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Caremarkstandard in 2006:
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for
director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any
reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a
system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
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suits against directors of publicly traded corporations has been expanding
the concept of good faith, the absence of which renders unavailable a
waiver or exculpation of traditional fiduciary duties. However, the burden
still falls on the plaintiff to prove causation and damages from the director's
breach. The burden of proof falls on the defendant only for self-dealing
when the transaction does not meet a procedural safe harbor, and then only
as to the elements of whether the transaction was fair and in the charity's
best interest. 188
Finally, in those rare cases when the fiduciary is found to violate the duty
of care, lenient enforcement or light punishment nearly always follows,
Twenty-one state statutes (including Delaware's) permit a nonprofit
corporation to adopt a charter amendment shielding directors from liability
for breaches of the duty of care' 89 (and all well-advised nonprofit
corporations would do so); courts can absolve charity fiduciaries of
monetary liability even in the absence of a charter shield. Many
legislatures have adopted other protections for volunteer nonprofit
90
directors. '
2. What Occurs in Practice
Michael Hone, the reporter of both the current California nonprofit
corporation statute and the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act,
observed that the law allows volunteer (uncompensated) directors, "in some
cases in fact, to almost be asleep at the gate":
It is my impression, from talking with state Attorney Generals [sic], that it
is almost impossible to win cases involving only inattentive management.
Where the directors are pillars of the community or spending hours of
their time, they are not good emotional defendants. Therefore, the
[Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation] Act has adopted a duty of care
which imposes liability only in particularly egregious cases. If one could
show years of inattention, then there would be liability. But if one had
just a single lapse, a terrible judgment, the business judgment rule would
protect directors. . . . The trust standard would hold the directors
personally liable for mere negligence. . . . It was the subcommittee's

attention. In either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations. Where
directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a
conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by
failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
188. See supra Part I.C.
189. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 121, app. at 514-17 tbl.3.
190. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 380 cmt. a, reporter's note 1
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
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opinion that if that were the standard adopted by the Act, very 1 few
91
sensible people would serve on the boards of nonprofit organizations.
This situation prompted Harvey Goldschmid to observe that the nonprofit
92
law's single greatest problem is "the nonfunctioning dead board."'
Despite this state of the law, financial protection remains a particular
concern for many current and prospective board members. As a threshold
matter, monetary protection is not generally available for intentional
breaches of the duty of loyalty. For breaches of the duty of care, however,
monetary protection is the norm-either under a charter provision or by
court decision-in keeping with the policy articulated in the ALI's
Principles of Corporate Governance that the financial injury to the
organization (and hence potentially to the fiduciaries) can be prohibitively
disproportionate to the personal benefits (financial and otherwise) of board
service. 193 As a result of the legal impediments to bringing suit and to
imposing monetary liability on individual fiduciaries, nonprofit director and
officer insurance policies are generally inexpensive.
At the same time, at least for charities, the absence of shareholders
weakens the rationale for permitting an overly generous monetary liability
shield. The 2006 draft revision of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
excepts from a charter liability shield only "(i) the amount of a financial
benefit received by a director or member of a designated body to which the
person is not entitled; (ii) an intentional infliction of harm on the
corporation or the members; (iii) a violation of section 8.33 [relating to
distributions]; or (iv) an intentional violation of criminal law."1 94 By slight
contrast, the 2007 draft ALI Nonprofit Principles additionally take the
position that "[p]ublic policy requires that those who govern charities
should be vulnerable to monetary sanctions for [intentional] breaches of the
duty of loyalty beyond self-dealing and deliberate infliction of harm and for
failing to conduct themselves in good faith."' 19 5 Under the draft Nonprofit
Principles, failure to act in good faith extends to intentional abdication of
the duty of care, including conscious abdication of oversight

191. Michael C. Hone, Aristotle and Lyndon Baines Johnson: Thirteen Ways of Looking
at Blackbirds and Nonprofit Corporations: The American Bar Association's Revised Model
Nonprofit CorporationAct, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 751, 771 (1989).
192. Harvey J. Goldschmid, Oral Comments presented at the Program on Philanthropy
and the Law (New York, New York, Oct. 18, 1996) (author's notes). See generally Harvey
J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems,and ProposedReforms, 23 J.Corp. L. 631 (1998).
193. Of course, the likelihood of monetary sanctions is little greater on the for-profit side
of the fence. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). Note
that personal liability for the outside directors in the WorldCom and Enron cases resulted
from settlements.
194. Proposed Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 2.02(b)(8) (3d ed. Exposure Draft 2006),

http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL580000/sitesofinterest-files/MNCAe
xposuredraft.doc.

195. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 370 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
Brackets reflect a clarification that will be made in the next draft.
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responsibilities.' 9 6 With the focus on board members' personal monetary
exposure, it can be easy to overlook the many available nonmonetary
equitable remedies (such as injunctions or removal) to address fiduciary
wrongdoing. 197
II. CONCLUSION: How CAN PRACTICE BE IMPROVED?

This essay's recognition of six "puzzling gaps" between law and practice
is not meant to suggest that the law should be modified to move closer to
current practices. While good nonprofit governance is the goal, compulsory
law is not the best route for improving behavior.
Commentators disagree about how to create an incentive and punishment
structure that will improve governing board performance. Most broadly,
advocates for increasing monetary penalties as the appropriate means of
inducing fiduciaries to take their jobs seriously face equally fervent
assertions that the risk of financial liability would drive away well-meaning
volunteers.
Given the absence of financial reward for most board
members-and the difficulty of measuring fiduciary behavior-I fall into
the latter camp. Nonprofits are more likely to be better run when the
regulatory focus endeavors to ensure that fiduciaries are informed of their
responsibilities, and when nonprofits are willing to pay for the staff and
outside advisers they need to help protect against poor decision making and
failures of internal control.
The ALI's 1992 Principles of Corporate Governance express the policy
that the potential damages for breach of duty of care-unlike for selfdealing-is far disproportionate to the financial benefits enjoyed by the
wrongdoer. Similarly, the 2007 draft ALl Nonprofit Principles take the
position that increasing the threat of monetary liability for breach of
fiduciary duties is unlikely to affect fiduciary behavior in a positive way.
Instead, the draft recommends making clear that while all board members
are responsible for governance, monetary sanctions for poor board member
behavior will be rare. Of course, the monetary shield would not apply in
cases of intentional breach of the duty of loyalty, or breach of the duty of
care not in good faith (including intentional abdication).' 98 Otherwise, the
draft urges, appropriate nonmonetary sanctions should be liberally applied,
with the dual aims of making board service more attractive and of alerting
fiduciaries that charities are entitled to a meaningful level of governance.
While I support a greater level of activism by charity regulators and the
courts in crafting nonfinancial remedies to wayward fiduciary behavior, I
appreciate that the enforcement has to be appropriate to the role of the state

196. Id.
197. See infra Part II.
198. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. §§ 360, 370 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
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with respect to the nonprofit sector. 199 Specifically, I hope that certain
recent enforcement actions do not portend a trend toward public
parochialism and paternalism. 0 0 Appropriate enforcement could lead to
increased settlements and injunctions mandating governing board and
management training, and adoption of best practices policies and
procedures; restructuring of board and removal of fiduciaries when
necessary; and even the closing down of charities and the transferring of
assets from charities that will not adopt and follow appropriate safeguards
to those charities that will. After all, when a charity has substantial assets
or responsibility for a program, society is ill served by allowing control to
remain with those who refuse to exercise minimal care.

199. See generally Joel L. Fleishman, Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizations and
the Need for Regulatory Reform, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing
America 172 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrlich eds., 1999).
200. See Brody, supra note 20.

